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Abstract 
 
Three Empirical Essays on  Financial Market Linkages in Macroeconomics  
Ellis Heath 
This dissertation highlights the effects of monetary and fiscal policy on financial markets 
both within and across borders. In the first essay I examine how credit affects both real 
GDP and inflation in the U.S. Without a well-functioning credit market, at least two 
principal components of GDP--consumer durables and investment--would suffer. Credit 
markets allow individuals and firms to match those with extra savings and those with 
more pressing spending and investing needs to mutually benefit each other. However, 
credit markets are diverse. Clearly, some credit variables would be expected to play a 
more important role in the macroeconomy than others. This paper examines the 
relationship between credit and the macroeconomy, specifically real GDP and inflation. I 
find that credit matters. Credit shocks affect real GDP and to a lesser extent inflation, but, 
not all credit measures do so. Real GDP reacts strongly to changes in credit-to-income 
ratios and certain interest rate spreads. Inflation, however, responds less so to credit 
shocks. That is not to say that credit shocks are not important for inflation. Particularly, 
certain credit aggregates and interest rate spreads that measure short-term and long-term 
rates appear to be influential for changes in inflation. In the second essay I use a dynamic 
panel data set to examine the effect of fiscal policy on real interest rates for a sample of 
59 nations covering the time period from 1970 through 2006. Controlling for both 
country and time effects, I find that changes in the national budget affect real interest 
rates. A one-percent increase in a country's deficit-to-output ratio corresponds to an 
increase in that country's real interest rate. This increase is statistically and economically 
significant; it ranges in magnitude from approximately 12 to 15 basis points. A surprising 
secondary result also emerges: a country's financial openness does not appear to play an 
important role in the determination of their real interest rate. Finally, the third essay 
illustrates how the Mexican equity market reacts to US monetary policy surprises. In this 
essay I also document whether the Mexican equity market reaction is asymmetric. I use a 
popular measure for US monetary surprises and I control for comovements in the US and 
Mexican equity markets. I find that when cyclical variations are measured according to 
real GDP growth, the Mexican equity market responds more to US monetary policy 
shocks when the Mexican economy is experiencing a downturn. This is important as it 
shows that the credit channel works across international borders.  
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CHAPTER 1. GENERAL OVERVIEW OF DISSERTATION 
Financial markets play an important role in the economy. They facilitate the transfer of 
capital, the transfer of risk and international trade. The linkage of financial markets with 
other sectors of the economy is widely accepted. However, the manner in which this linkage 
takes place is debated. Theory sometimes helps. For example, Bernanke and Blinder (1988) 
show that monetary policy in the U.S. transmits to the real economy through the credit 
market. Jensen and Johnson (1995), Jensen et al (1996), Thorbecke (1997), Patelis (1997), 
Ehrmann and Fratzscher (2004), Rigobon and Sack (2004), Gurkaynak et al (2004) and 
Bernanke and Kuttner (2005) find that the unexpected component of U.S. monetary policy 
affects U.S. equity markets. Johnson and Jensen (1993), Ehrmann and Fratzscher (2002, 
2006), Ehrmann et al (2005) and Wongswan (2005, 2006) find that this effect extends across 
border and can affect foreign equity markets. While Laubach (2003) and Engen and Hubbard 
(2004) disagree on the magnitude of the effect of fiscal policy changes on real interest rates, 
both of their results support the notion that fiscal policy and real interest rates are linked. 
 Most previous studies look only at the relationship between credit and the real 
economy. Few studies look at the relationship between credit and inflation. In Chapter 2, I 
examine the link between credit and the macro economy. I use several different measures of 
credit--interest rate spreads, credit aggregates and debt-to-income ratios--to this effect. I, 
then, attempt to quantify which measures of credit have the most explanatory power for real 
output and inflation in the U.S. I find that credit matters for real output, but much less so for 
inflation. More importantly, I come to the conclusion that the choice of credit variable is 
fundamental. Different credit variables give different results. Furthermore, for the macro 
 2 
economy no one credit variable is uniquely important. Some matter more for real output and 
others, more for inflation. 
 According Keynesian IS/LM theory, fiscal policy via adjustments in the national 
budget can impact real interest rates. In a closed economy, government decisions concerning 
spending and taxation will have influence the level of a country's real interest rate. These 
effects are mitigated the more open the economy is. In Barro (1974) the term Ricardian 
equivalence is given. It states the Keynesian view may not hold. National budget decisions 
will not affect national savings and therefore, a country's real interest rate will remain 
unaffected as well. 
 Empirically, the literature supports the Keynesian view. However, the magnitude of this 
effect is disputed. In Chapter 3, I use a dynamic panel data set of 59 advanced, developed and 
transitional economies from 1970 through 2006 and find that fiscal policy affects real interest 
rates, but I find this effect to be small and temporary. I control for financial openness and 
surprisingly find that it does not appear to be important to the process. This is also occurs in the 
growth literature. There they have not had much success in capturing significant effects of 
financial openness on economic growth.  
 In Chapter 4, I look at the Mexican equity market and examine how it responds to U.S. 
monetary surprises. I also investigate whether this effect is dependent on the state of the Mexican 
economy. I find that the Mexican equity market drops by over six percent when there is an 
unexpected 100 basis-point increase in the federal funds target rate. I also find that the state of 
the Mexican economy matters. During economic downturns in Mexico, the Mexican equity 
market reaction to US monetary surprises is highly significant, both statistically and 
economically. Furthermore, this reaction is significantly different from the reaction of the equity 
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market when Mexico is growing economically. This result supports the credit channel theory 
across international borders. 
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CHAPTER 2. DO CREDIT VARIABLES AFFECT REAL 
OUTPUT AND  INFLATION? IF SO, WHICH ONES? 
2.1 INTRODUCTION 
The importance of credit in the United States (U.S.) economy is well-documented. Bernanke and 
Blinder (1988) show in a theoretical framework how credit can affect real economic activity. In 
his empirical study of the Great Depression, Bernanke (1983) provides evidence of credit market 
failure as a catalyst that accelerated and worsened the effects of that recession. Friedman and 
Kuttner (1993) develop a sophisticated theoretical model and then empirically, using credit 
spreads show that credit markets matter for real economic activity. White (2006) argues that 
credit growth can have real effects on real output. In fact, both he and the Bank for International 
Settlements (BIS) express the view that credit growth is of such importance that it should be 
targeted by central banks just as prices are.
1
 However, when discussing credit effects on real 
economic activity, it is not clear what the actual credit variables of interest should be. In the 
literature credit measures are varied. Credit aggregates, specific interest rates, interest rate 
spreads, credit ratios and lending standards are the most conventional ones. While examples of 
each may be found in the literature to represent credit in the economy, they do not provide the 
same results when looking at the impact of credit on real GDP and inflation. Using a variety of 
credit variables, the purpose of this paper is to examine the relationship between credit and real 
output. Additionally, I also look at the effect of credit on inflation.  
 Kaufmann and Valderrama (2007) use a credit aggregate ─ private credit ─ and find that 
for the U.S., credit shocks have a procyclical impact on real output. The effect of a private credit 
shock on prices is small. Also, using private credit, but for OECD countries, Claessens, Kose and 
Terrones (2008) observe that one out of every six recessions is accompanied by a credit crunch. 
                                                 
1
 See BIS 77th Annual Report. 
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Friedman and Kuttner (1992, 1998) look at the spread between six-month commercial paper and 
Treasury bills (paper-bill spread). They find that from the mid 1950s through the mid 1990s six-
month paper-bill spreads averaged around 90 basis points six months before a recession and 
about 100 basis points during a recession. Otherwise, the average was closer to 50 basis points. 
In other words, the six-month paper-bill spread widened just before recessions. Increases in the 
spread are thought to be associated with all or some of the following: Tightening of monetary 
policy; increase in expectations of bankruptcies; and increase in cash requirements of firms. 
Lown and Morgan (2004) look at credit standards using survey results from the Federal 
Reserve's Senior Loan Officer Opinion Survey.
2
 They conclude that credit standards can affect 
real activity through inventory investment. A tightening of credit standards during a recession is 
associated with a similar reduction in inventory investment. Swiston (2008) develops an index to 
measure financial conditions in the U.S. In addition to standards being important for real 
economic activity, he finds that corporate bond yields and high yield spreads are slightly 
significant as well. However, in his study some other measures, like the London Interbank 
Offered Rate (LIBOR) and credit aggregates in general, appear not to be. Bayoumi and Melander 
(2008) find that a bank's capital-to-asset ratio impacts real GDP in the US. This effect works 
through the credit market by changing credit availability in the economy. Murphy (1998) finds 
that past debt service burden ratios can explain consumption innovations; this relationship is 
negative. King (1994) proposes that countries with the largest debt ratio increases in the 1980s 
suffered the most during the 1990-91 recession. 
 Most studies look only at the link between credit and the real economy. Very few studies 
look at the relationship between credit and inflation. Kaufmann and Valderrama (2007) use 
private credit and find that reactions from inflation to credit shocks are minimal. Furthermore, 
                                                 
2
 This is a quarterly survey given by the Fed to loan officers at large banks in the U.S. 
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these credit shocks do not appear to have much importance in explaining the variability of 
inflations.  
 Thus, according to the literature, credit matters for real GDP, but much less so for 
inflation. The question, then, is not whether credit matters, but rather what credit variables matter 
for the real GDP and inflation. Here, I use a host of popular interest rate spreads, credit 
aggregates and debt-to-income ratios to examine which measures of credit have the most 
explanatory power for real output and inflation in the US. Using a vector autoregression (VAR) 
framework with generalized impulse response functions and generalized variance 
decompositions, I find that no credit variable significantly affects real output permanently. 
Interest-rate spreads and to a lesser extent debt-to-income ratios provide the most explanatory 
power of innovations in real GDP. Of the credit aggregates, only private credit is statistically 
important for describing changes in real GDP. Furthermore, most of the effects from the credit 
variables on real GDP dissipate by the end of the first year. At most, interest-rate spreads explain 
approximately 15 to 20 percent of the forecast error variance in real output after twenty quarters. 
For inflation, only shocks to certain credit aggregates and some interest-rate spreads seem to be 
important; shocks to debt-to-income ratios effects are never statistically different from zero. 
Variance decompositions of inflation show that some credit aggregates can account for over 20 
percent of the forecast error variance in inflation at the five-year mark. Credit matters, but it 
depends on the measure used and at best, credit shocks are temporary as far as real output 
reactions and changes in inflation are concerned. 
 The contribution of this paper is not a theoretical one. This study is entirely empirical. 
What does emerge from these results is that certain types of credit variables feature more than 
others when changes occur to real GDP and inflation. This is useful first and foremost to 
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policymakers, but it could be useful to theoreticians, as good new theory concerning the behavior 
of real GDP and inflation to credit disturbances is needed in the literature. While other studies 
also examine different credit variables, I find that one overlooked category--credit-to-income 
ratios-is important. I also highlight interest rate spreads and provide a comparison of different 
types. 
 In section 2.2 I discuss the possible explanations of how different credit variables affect 
real GDP and inflation. Section 2.3 is a discussion of the methodology and data; here, I also 
outline the hypotheses that I test. In section 2.4, the results are discussed as well as their 
robustness. Finally, section 2.5 concludes.  
2.2 THE TRANSMISSION OF CREDIT EFFECTS 
Generally, credit is thought to be linked to the macro economy through its effect on 
consumption, specifically consumer durables. From the life-cycle model, as given by Ando and 
Modigliani (1963), credit serves the sole purpose of transferring consumption from high income 
periods to low income ones; the interest rate is the same for both borrowers and lenders. 
Allowing for higher interest rates for debt servicing as compared to lending adds a great deal of 
complexity to the analysis. Ludvigson (1999) proposes a model that recreates the empirical 
finding that consumer credit growth predicts consumption growth. Antzoulatos (1996) shows 
that models that do not account for credit growth tend to predict consumption levels that are 
smaller than the actual levels in times of strong income growth. Olney (1999) suggests that the 
large drop in consumption in 1930 at the beginning of the Great Depression could be associated 
with a credit shock. In Fisher (1933), a model is given that suggests that when high debt burdens 
are present, exongenous shocks have a greater impact than otherwise. 
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 Both in the Keynes IS/LM and the Austrian business cycle models, a central problem for 
a monetary economy occurs when the rate of interest at which commercial banks are willing to 
lend (financial rate of interest) is different from the rate of interest determined by real factors 
(natural rate of interest).
3
 Assuming a starting point for the economy where real output equals 
potential real output, in the IS/LM model, when the financial rate of interest is higher than the 
natural rate of interest, real output will deviate away from the potential real output, resulting in 
an economic downturn. Also, if the natural rate of interest is higher than the financial rate of 
interest, an increase in real output away from potential real output will occur as will higher 
inflation. 
 In the Austrian model, the latter case above does not necessarily imply inflation as in the 
IS/LM model. Credit creation occurring from the financial rate of interest being less than the 
natural rate encourages investment in anticipation of future increases in the demand for goods 
and services. This increase in demand never happens and therefore, the investments undertaken 
never become profitable. Also, the byproduct of over-investment is a surplus of capital goods. 
Capital goods are durable, but not fungible, therefore, mistakes in investment are durable as well 
and corrections take time. Hence, inflation may not occur; instead, the economy may experience 
a speculative bubble.  
 The growth in credit aggregates, such as private credit, can be used as a proxy for credit. 
By comparing this type of variable to the growth in real GDP and inflation, credit market effects 
can be isolated. Changes in credit aggregates can be used as a proxy for credit cycles. Credit 
cycles are considered to be pro-cyclical.
4
 Therefore, negative growth of credit aggregates would 
be associated with downturns in the credit cycle and negative growth of real GDP. While 
                                                 
3
 See Hicks (1967) essay on the Keynes-Hayek debate for a more thorough discussion of credit, real output and 
inflation in both the IS/LM and Austrian models.  
4
 See Borio et al (2001). 
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positive growth of the credit aggregates would happen in credit cycle booms and in the IS/LM 
case, increases in inflation would be the result. In the Austrian model, this would not necessarily 
be the case. 
 Another measure of credit is the ratio of credit-to-income. This variable captures 
incidents of when credit is growing at a different rate than income and hence can be used to 
proxy credit cycles as well. Analysis of this variable follows in the same light as with the growth 
in credit aggregates. 
 Finally, another variable of interest is the interest-rate spread. Here, comparisons of 
different prices for credit can be made. Changes in interest-rate spreads suggest changes in credit 
availability for different types of borrowers. The number of interest-rate spreads is wide and 
varied. Interpretations of each are different. For example, changes in the paper-bill spread are 
thought to be a leading indicator of the business cycle.
5
 When the difference between six-month 
commercial paper and Treasury bills grows, tightening of monetary policy is thought to occur.
6
 
Tighter monetary policy forces borrowers to use direct financing methods instead of indirect 
ones. This increases the supply of commercial paper, lowering the price and raising the interest 
rate. This increase occurs at a rate that is greater than that from the tightening of monetary 
policy. 
 Another possible channel involving the paper-bill spread is one in which commercial 
paper and Treasury bills are not viewed as perfect substitutes by investors. Cook (1981) points 
out this imperfect substitutability and suggests that it may stem from the fact that state-tax laws 
vary in their treatment of interest earned on commercial paper, while all states treat interest 
earned from Treasury bills as exempt, and commercial paper is less liquid than Treasury bills 
                                                 
5
 See Friedman and Kuttner (1998). 
6
 See Bernanke (1990). 
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are. In this framework, the paper-bill may be related to the business cycle if monetary policy 
becomes restrictive and forces borrowers to use direct financing or low aggregate demand forces 
firms to raise funds through direct financing since they are not able to do so through the goods 
and services market. However, this framework also allows for movement in the paper-bill spread 
that is unrelated to the business cycle. State, local and foreign governments buy up the Treasury 
bills independent of business cycle factors. This forces borrowers to raise cash through the 
issuance of commercial paper and thereby increasing the paper-bill spread. 
 In a counter argument, Kashyap et al. (1993) and Thoma and Gray (1994) suggest that 
over time the substitutability of commercial paper and Treasury bills is greater due to more 
evolved financial markets. This increases substitutability implying that the systematic 
relationship of this spread with business cycles has become noise rather than determinant. 
 Finally, interest rate spreads are also thought to represent distress in the credit market. 
For example, the LIBOR-Federal Funds effective rate spread is less studied in academic 
literature but quite popular in the financial press.
7
 The LIBOR is a market-based short term 
interest rate at which banks can borrow funds from each other. It is very similar to the Federal 
Funds rate, except that the LIBOR is determined by the market. It is determined daily by 16 large 
banks. The LIBOR is important given that it is used as a benchmark in the U.S. for pricing both 
consumer and business loans, especially mortgages. In contrast, the Federal Funds rate is 
determined by the US monetary authorities. Normally, the spread between the LIBOR and the 
Federal Funds rate is stable and small. A widening of the spread is thought to be an indicator of a 
credit bottleneck. Credit is easier among larger institutions, but not outside of this circle. 
Therefore, banks can obtain cash easily, but they are not willing to lend it out, as reflected by the 
                                                 
7
 For examples of this, see the following articles online in The Wall Street Journal both here 
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB120489585652819527.html by Gaffen and here by Ip 
http://blogs.wsj.com/marketbeat/2008/03/06/credit-crunch-iii-mortgage-backed-drift/ (accessed March 12, 2008). 
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higher LIBOR rate relative to the Fed Funds effective rate. It is also possible that this spread 
widens due to private investment demand growing relative to stable monetary policy. This would 
have the opposite effect on the real economy. An extension of this is to look at the spread 
between higher risk instruments and lower risk ones (such as Baa yields and the LIBOR). An 
increase in these types of spread would suggest that more credit worthy institutions are not 
having as much relative difficulty in raising credit as are those that are less credit worthy. In 
other words, the risk premium increases. This would follow along the lines of the credit channel 
theory in which high risk firms suffer not only from conditions in the credit market, but 
additionally, due to their inability to raise funds internally. 
 Of these theories, only the Keynes IS/LM model predicts for inflationary effects from the 
credit market. Austrian theory allows for them, but does not guarantee them. Most studies 
involving inflation and credit look at how inflation effects credit, rather than how credit affects 
inflation.
8
 For real output this is not the case.  
2.3 TESTABLE HYPOTHESES, METHODOLOGY AND DATA 
In this paper, I set out to test the following hypotheses: 1) Credit matters for real US GDP; 2) 
Credit matters for inflation in the US; 3) For the US, different measures of credit give different 
results. I assume that credit is an endogenous variable in an endogenous system of macro and 
monetary variables. 
 I employ a VAR framework to examine the effect of different credit variables on both 
real output and inflation in the US. Given that monetary policy must be controlled for, I use a 
VAR model based on previous monetary policy studies.
9
 The traditional variables in these 
studies include real output, inflation, the Federal Funds rate, and commodity prices. The 
                                                 
8
 See Debelle (2004) for example. 
9
 For example, see Bernanke and Blinder (1992), Leeper and Gordon (1994), Christiano, Eichenbaum and Evans 
(1996) and Bernanke and Mihov (1998). 
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commodity price variable, due to Sims (1992) and now typical in the literature, is included to 
control for the "price puzzle." The price puzzle refers to the fact that in VAR estimations 
inflation initially responds positively to restrictive monetary policy. Including the commodity 
price index is considered to provide forward-looking information about inflation that is unique to 
the Fed. 
 Bernanke, Gertler and Watson (1997) add oil prices to the VAR model given above in 
order to examine the role oil shocks play in the US economy. Lown and Morgan (2004) add 
credit standards in the same manner to see the importance they have in the US economy and 
conclude that a reduction in credit standards during a recession is associated with a similar 
reduction in inventory investment.
10
 Kaufmann and Valderrama (2007) add private credit and 
asset prices to see how real output and inflation are affected.
11
 Following their lead, I do the 
same by adding a credit variable to the traditional monetary policy VAR model. I rotate among 
different categories of credit variables from 1986 through 2008 to see which variable is the most 
indicative of changes in real output and/or inflation. 
 The reduced form VAR model is given by: 
     
n
i
titit YY
1
     (1) 
where Yt and Yt-i are vectors that include real output, inflation, commodity prices, the Federal 
Funds rate and a credit variable. The following assumptions are made: 
  t.allfor    )( and  0)( ttt EE  
 In a traditional VAR model, impulse response functions are obtained in the manner 
below: 
                                                 
10
 The time period for their study is from 1967 through 2003 with a gap from 1984 to 1990 when standards were not 
reported. This gap and the fact that this study goes from 1986 through most of 2008 make comparison of standards 
with other credit variables not conducive for this paper. 
11
 Kaufmann and Valderrama (2007) do not include the commodity price index in their paper, therefore their model 
is a five-variable VAR as well. 
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     jij Pei)(       (2) 
 
where ξj represents the impulse response function, θi is the infinite moving average matrix 
obtained from the Wold decomposition of Equation 1, P is a lower Choleski decomposition of Σ 
and finally, ej is a selection vector in which the impulse j is one and the other elements are zero. 
 Here, following Pesaran and Shin (1998), a generalized impulse response function 
(GIRF) is used.
12
 It is given below: 
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where ζjj is the element from the jth row and jth column of the variance-covariance matrix Σ. 
 For variance decompositions, the generalized version is calculated as follows: 
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compared to the usual variance decomposition: 
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 The benefit from using GIRFs and generalized variance decompositions is that the 
ordering of the variables in the VAR does not matter. If Σ is non-diagonal, then, the order of the 
variables matters in VAR analysis, but in generalized analysis it does not.
13
  
 The data is quarterly with 92 observations and spans from the first quarter of 1986 
through the fourth quarter of 2008.
14
 The sources and the transformations of the data are given in 
                                                 
12
 Pesaran and Shin (1998) give the theoretical framework for GIRFs and generalized variance decompositions. For 
empirical studies that employ this framework, see Wang (2005) and Kaufmann and Valderrama (2007). 
13
 In Section 2.4.5 I report the Choleski Decomposition results that differ from the generalized ones. 
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Table 2 - 1. Also, as determined by the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC), the lag selection is 
four quarters. 
2.4 EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
First, I report the generalized impulse response functions of real GDP and inflation to a one-
standard deviation credit shock. I do this for each credit variable. This shows how real GDP and 
inflation react to disturbances in the credit variable and how the variables interact with each 
other. To determine how important the credit shocks are in explaining changes in real GDP and 
inflation, I examine the generalized variance decompositions of real GDP and inflation. 
 Since I use generalized impulse response functions and generalized variance 
decompositions, the results do not dependent on the ordering of the variables and therefore they 
are independent of any preconceived notion of how these variables might interact in both the 
short term and long term. Because of this, no restrictions are necessary. 
2.4.1 Generalized Impulse Response Functions for real GDP  
In Figure 2 - 1, the generalized impulse response functions of real GDP for the VAR models 
using credit aggregates are given. These variables are Private Credit, Domestic, non-financial 
Credit Market Debt Outstanding, Household, non-financial Credit Market Debt Outstanding, 
Total Consumer Credit Outstanding, Commercial Bank Consumer Credit Outstanding, Finance 
Companies Consumer Credit Outstanding, Credit Unions Consumer Credit Outstanding, Savings 
Institutions Consumer Credit Outstanding and Non-financial Business Consumer Credit 
Outstanding. The size of the shocks is equal one standard deviation of the credit variable. Of the 
aggregates only Private Credit and Savings Institutions Consumer Credit Outstanding are 
                                                                                                                                                             
14
 Before 1986, usage of LIBOR rates for the US was not considered to be truly market-oriented. 
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statistically significant. Both are statistically significant in the third and second quarters, 
respectively, after the initial shock, but not before nor after.  
 Private Credit is the most commonly used credit aggregate in the literature. It is reported 
by the IMF and consists of the claims on the private sector both for banking institutions and 
nonbank financial institutions. Kaufmann and Valderrama (2007) find that shocks to private 
credit have a slightly positive effect on real US GDP during recessionary periods and no effect 
otherwise. Not accounting for state-dependence, the effect I find is similar to theirs in both 
magnitude and longevity. 
 The Savings Institutions Consumer Credit Outstanding variable is not commonly looked 
at in general monetary models. It is reported regularly by the Federal Reserve. In a case study of 
US recessions from 1960 through 1990, Bernanke and Lown (1991) look at a similar variable 
and find that mortgages held by savings institutions behaved irregularly. In most of the six 
recessions that they investigate, this credit aggregate grew, but in the 1990 recession it shrank by 
20 percent. Both here and in their study the level of importance of this variable on real output 
appears to be minimal. 
 The fact that the other credit aggregates are not statistically significant is not surprising. 
Swiston (2008) looks at some of the same credit aggregates in a VAR framework but with 
Cholesky decomposed shocks and finds that credit aggregates are not important for innovations 
in real GDP.
15
 
 Figure 2 - 2 shows the generalized impulse response functions from a shock to various 
credit-to-income ratios on real GDP. The credit-to-income ratios used are Household Debt 
Service Ratio, Financial Obligations Ratio, Total Homeowner Financial Obligations Ratio, 
                                                 
15
 The common credit aggregates in his study and mine are banks loans, household credit, and non-financial business 
credit. 
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Homeowner Financial Mortgage Obligations Ratio and Homeowner Financial Consumer 
Obligations Ratio. All of the ratios impact real GDP. Increases in the ratios are followed by 
negative responses in real GDP. These shock are statistically significant in all cases, except for 
Homeowner Financial Consumer Obligations Ratio, which is marginal so. 
 The Household Debt Service Ratio is the ratio of debt payments to disposable personal 
income. The debt payments are the estimated required payments on outstanding mortgages and 
consumer debt. The Financial Obligations Ratios are a wider measure than the Household Debt 
Service Ratio. They include automobile lease payments, rental payments on tenant-occupied 
property, homeowners' insurance, and property tax payments. Maki (2000) looks at the effect of 
the Household Debt Service Ratio on consumption and does not find a strong statistical link. 
However, he does not look at real GDP. He also does not assume an endogenous system. The 
Financial Obligations Ratios are used as a measure of the credit markets in general, but are often 
overlooked when measuring credit market impacts on real GDP.
16
  
 Figure 2 - 3 provides the generalized impulse response functions for the response of the 
annualized quarterly growth rate of real GDP to one standard deviation shocks to various interest 
rate spreads. The interest rate spreads are expressed in terms of quarterly averages. The interest 
rate spreads are the Aaa-Federal Funds spread, the Aaa-LIBOR spread, the Aaa-10-year Treasury 
rate spread, the Aaa-3-month Treasury bill spread, the Baa-Federal Funds rate spread, the Baa-
LIBOR spread, the Baa-10-year Treasury rate spread, the Baa-3-month Treasury bill spread, the 
Credit Card-LIBOR spread, the LIBOR-Federal Funds rate spread and the 24-month Personal 
Credit-LIBOR spread. 
 Numerous spreads exhibit a statistically significant impact on real GDP, some more so 
than others however. All spreads comparing Aaa and Baa rates with the long-term 10-year 
                                                 
16
 See Dynan et al (2003) and Johnson (2005) for example. 
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Treasury rate are important for real GDP. The spread between the Baa rates and the 10-year 
Treasury ones is commonly known as the "Default" spread. Widening of this spread indicates an 
increase in the liquidity premium; short-term borrowers are more credit constrained relative to 
those who have locked in longer term rates. It also measures the risk premium since the Baa rate 
is the rate offered on corporate bonds by the riskier firms and the 10-year Treasury rate is 
considered risk-free. The result here is much more significant than that obtained by Swiston 
(2008). The surprising result is that the spreads with the Aaa and Baa rates and Federal Funds 
rate does not appear to be important. The difference between either the Aaa or Baa rates and the 
LIBOR is marginally so; in the second quarter after an initial shock to either spread, real GDP 
exhibits a statistically significant negative response. Both the Credit Card-LIBOR spread and the 
24-month Personal Credit-LIBOR spread are initially important for innovations in real GDP. 
Here, two extremes of credit risk are being captured. Another surprising result is the reaction of 
real GDP to the LIBOR-FF rate spread. Here, I find a positive response from real GDP to shocks 
to this spread. While in the literature not much work has been done with the LIBOR-FF spread as 
it relates to the macro economy, a recent report from Citigroup Global Markets, Inc. found a 
similar result.
17
 Swiston (2008) also finds that shocks to the LIBOR by itself cause an increase in 
real GDP. As mentioned earlier, this could be due to the demand for private investment 
increasing relative to the Federal Funds rate. 
2.4.2 Generalized Impulse Response Functions for Inflation  
In Figure 2 - 4, the generalized impulse response functions of inflation as measured by the 
annualized quarterly growth rate of the GDP deflator for the VAR models using credit 
aggregates are provided. Here, some of the credit aggregates do appear to have an important role. 
                                                 
17
 See Diclemente and Schoenholtz (2008). 
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Shocks to Consumer Credit Outstanding and its sub-series for Commercial Banks and Credit 
Unions appear to play an important role for one quarter in the inflation series. The other series 
Domestic Non-financial Credit Market Debt Outstanding does as well. It is not clear what the 
theoretical explanation might be for this. The best description would come from the Austrian 
business cycle theory that would suggest a growth in credit aggregates could indicate a 
speculative bubble forming in the economy which in turn would be followed by a correction, or 
contraction in real GDP. Empirically, Kaufmann and Valderrama (2007) find that the Private 
Credit aggregate provides no information about inflation. Shocks to this variable are statistically 
insignificant for the real US GDP series. 
 In Figure 2 - 5 the generalized impulse response functions for the response of the 
annualized quarterly growth rate of the GDP deflator to one standard deviation shocks to various 
credit ratio-to-income variables is given. The credit ratios are expressed in terms of quarterly 
averages. The credit variables are the following: Household Debt Service Ratio, Financial 
Obligations Ratio, Total Homeowner Financial Obligations Ratio, Homeowner Financial 
Obligations Ratio: Mortgage and Homeowner Financial Obligations Ratio: Consumer. 
 All of the ratios have no statistically significant effect on inflation with the possible 
exception of the Homeowner Financial Consumer Obligations Ratio. This ratio appears to have a 
slight effect that is statistically significant in the second quarter after the initial shock.  
 Figure 2 - 6 shows the generalized impulse response functions for the response of the 
annualized quarterly growth rate of the GDP deflator to one standard deviation shocks to various 
interest rate spreads. As before, the interest rate spreads are expressed in terms of quarterly 
averages and include the Aaa-Federal Funds spread, the Aaa-LIBOR spread, the Aaa-10-year 
Treasury rate spread, the Aaa-3-month Treasury bill spread, the Baa-Federal Funds rate spread, 
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the Baa-LIBOR spread, the Baa-10-year Treasury rate spread, the Baa-3-month Treasury bill 
spread, the Credit Card-LIBOR spread, the LIBOR-Federal Funds rate spread and the 24-month 
Personal Credit-LIBOR spread. 
 Here, with the exception of the Aaa-10-year Treasury rate, there is no statistical effect 
from shocks to these variables on inflation. In the first quarter shocks to the Aaa-10-year 
Treasury rate spread have a negative impact on inflation. This would follow Keynesian IS/LM 
theory would predict since an increase in this spread is associated with economic downturns and 
hence, lower inflation. 
2.4.3 Generalized Variance Decompositions for real GDP  
Table 2 - 2 gives the generalized variance decomposition of the annualized quarterly growth rate 
of real GDP under various VAR frameworks with different credit aggregates variables. As with 
the generalized impulse response functions, the most important credit aggregates for changes in 
real GDP are Private Credit and Savings Institutions Consumer Credit Outstanding. Both explain 
approximately ten percent of the error variance in real GDP from two quarters to twelve quarters 
out. The two non-financial credit market variables (domestic and household) and Commercial 
Bank Consumer Credit Outstanding explain about six percent of the forecast error variance at the 
four-year mark. 
 From Table 2 - 3 the generalized variance decomposition of real GDP with different 
credit-to-income ratio variables is provided. Clearly, all of the credit ratios in general account for 
a similar magnitude of the forecast error variance as the best credit aggregates. Furthermore, the 
explanatory power of the credit ratios is high even in the first quarter. 
 In Table 2 - 4 the generalized variance decomposition of real GDP with different interest 
rate spreads is given. Again, as with the generalized impulse response functions in Figure 2 - 3, 
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the same interest rate spreads that were important in Figure 2 - 3 are the ones that account for the 
most error variance in real GDP. Here, over fifteen percent of the forecast error variance in real 
GDP can be accounted for by some interest rate spreads. 
2.4.4 Generalized Variance Decompositions for Inflation 
The generalized variance decomposition of inflation with various credit aggregates variables can 
be found in Table 2 - 5. The two non-financial credit market variables (domestic and household) 
account for approximately one-fifth of the error variance in inflation through twelve quarters. Of 
the credit aggregates, for inflation these are by far the most important. Private Credit seems to 
have the least explanatory power, accounting for only five percent of the forecast errors in 
inflation at the four-year mark. 
 For inflation, Table 2 - 6 shows that credit-to-income ratio variables do not account for 
much of the error variance in inflation. At best, the Homeowner Financial Consumer Obligations 
Ratio explains a little over seven percent of the forecast errors in inflation within the first year. 
 In Table 2 - 7 the generalized variance decomposition of inflations under various VAR 
frameworks with different interest rate spreads is given. At just under twenty percent, the Baa-
10-year Treasury rate spread explains the forecast errors in inflation the best. In general, with the 
exception of the Baa-10-year Treasury rate spread the other interest rate spreads only account for 
just over five percent of the error variance in inflation. 
2.4.5 Robustness of Results 
Changing the lag lengths to two instead of four did not change the results significantly, nor did 
using a lag length of eight. These results were also robust to using monthly data and substituting 
Industrial Production and the Consumer Price Index for GDP and the GDP deflator. I also 
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differenced real GDP, the GDP deflator, the Commodity Index and the credit variables. Again, 
the results were robust to these changes. 
 I also looked at the system of equations using Choleski decompositions instead of the 
generalized framework.
18
 In general, the results were similar with some exceptions. The Aaa-10-
year Treasury rate spread, the Credit Card-LIBOR spread, the LIBOR-Federal Funds rate spread 
and the 24-month Personal Credit-LIBOR spread no longer have a significant impact on real 
GDP. For inflation, only the Aaa-10-year Treasury rate spread loses explanatory power. 
 To test whether the year 2008 is driving the results, I re-ran the VAR system through 
2007 only. There were no significant changes except for the Aaa-10-year Treasury rate spread's 
impact on inflation. Again, as with the Choleski decomposition framework, this spread became 
less important for innovations in inflation. 
2.5 CONCLUDING REMARKS 
In any field certain components of a variable may or may not play a larger role in the relationship 
that variable has with other variables. For example, in determining cycles in real GDP, the role 
each component of real GDP plays is varied. Some, such as the consumer durables component, 
are extremely important for real GDP cycles. Changes in the subcategory--consumer durables--
match well with changes in the overall category--real GDP. Others, such as government 
spending, however, do not. Here, I argue that the same applies to credit and how it affects the 
macro economy. Certain types of credit variables are more important than others. Certainly, for 
policymakers, as well as agents in the economy, knowing what type of credit disturbances have 
the most impact on real GDP and inflation is essential to better understand perturbations in 
macro economy. 
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 In all variations, the credit variable was in the last position which is the weakest position. This is the general 
method as given by the literature. 
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 Credit shocks affect real GDP and to a lesser extent inflation, but, not just any credit 
measures does so. Real GDP reacts strongly to changes in credit-to-income ratios and certain 
interest rate spreads. The spreads that are the most important are those that measure the highest 
risk rates against the lowest risk rates, specifically rates that individuals pay for risky loans 
versus those that large banks pay on loans to each other. Also, important are the corporate bond 
spreads that measure the short-term rates versus the safest long-term rate (10-year Treasury 
rates). When the importance of these credit shocks to real GDP is examined, clearly the interest 
rate spreads of the type described above feature prominently. So too do the credit-to-income 
ratios, but to a lesser extent. Shocks to one credit aggregate, private credit, also are important in 
describing the variability in real GDP, even though the reaction of real GDP to private credit 
shocks is barely significant statistically. 
 Inflation, however, responds less so to credit shocks. That is not to say that credit shocks 
are not important for inflation. Particularly, certain credit aggregates and interest rate spreads 
that measure short-term and long-term rates appear to be influential for innovations in inflation. 
Shocks to consumer credit outstanding and some subcategories of this series move inflation. 
Uniquely among the interest rate spreads, only shocks to the Aaa-10-year Treasury spread appear 
to cause variations in inflation. Inflation does not seem to respond to shocks to credit-to-income 
ratios.  
 Of all the credit variables, one variable stands out. The Baa-10-year Treasury rate spread 
stands out for the important role it has in explaining innovations in both real GDP and inflation. 
This seems to be the most important single credit variable in this study. 
 This paper contributes to the literature by highlighting some important empirical findings. 
I find that credit matters for real GDP and inflation, but not in the same way. For innovations in 
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real GDP and inflation, the source of the credit disturbance is important. The literature lacks a 
good theoretical explanation of the issue of why certain credit variables would be important for 
real GDP and inflation and others would not. Most explanations are anecdotal. Ideally, the 
empirical results here and in other studies could be used to help form a strong theoretical 
framework that might illustrate the channels through which credit disturbances impact real 
output and inflation. 
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2.6 APPENDIX 
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In Figure 2 - 1 the generalized impulse response functions for the response of the 
annualized quarterly growth rate of real GDP to one standard deviation shocks to various 
credit aggregates variables. The credit aggregates are also expressed in terms of 
annualized quarterly growth rate. The credit variables are the following: Private credit, 
Domestic, non-financial Credit Market Debt Outstanding, Household, non-financial 
Credit Market Debt Outstanding, Total Consumer Credit Outstanding, Commercial Bank 
Consumer Credit Outstanding, Finance Companies Consumer Credit Outstanding, Credit 
Unions Consumer Credit Outstanding, Savings Institutions Consumer Credit Outstanding 
and Non-financial Business Consumer Credit Outstanding. 
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Figure 2 - 2 
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In Figure 2 - 2 the generalized impulse response functions for the response of the 
annualized quarterly growth rate of real GDP to one standard deviation shocks to various 
credit ratio-to-income variables is given. The credit ratios are expressed in terms of 
quarterly averages. The credit variables are the following: Household Debt Service Ratio, 
Financial Obligations Ratio, Total Homeowner Financial Obligations Ratio, Homeowner 
Financial Obligations Ratio: Mortgage and Homeowner Financial Obligations Ratio: 
Consumer. 
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Figure 2 - 3 
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In Figure 2 - 3 the generalized impulse response functions for the response of the 
annualized quarterly growth rate of real GDP to one standard deviation shocks to various 
interest rate spreads are given. The interest rate spreads are expressed in terms of 
quarterly averages. The credit variables are the following spreads: Aaa-Federal Funds 
rate; Aaa-LIBOR; Aaa-10-year Treasury rate; Aaa-3-month Treasury bill rate; Baa-
Federal Funds rate; Baa-LIBOR; Baa-10-year Treasury rate; Baa-3-month Treasury bill 
rate; Credit Card-LIBOR; LIBOR-Federal Funds rate; and 24-month Personal Credit-
LIBOR. 
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Figure 2 - 4 
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In Figure 2 - 4 the generalized impulse response functions for the response of the 
annualized quarterly growth rate of the GDP deflator to one standard deviation shocks to 
various credit aggregates variables. The credit aggregates are also expressed in terms of 
annualized quarterly growth rate. The credit variables are the following: Private credit, 
Domestic, non-financial Credit Market Debt Outstanding, Household, non-financial 
Credit Market Debt Outstanding, Total Consumer Credit Outstanding, Commercial Bank 
Consumer Credit Outstanding, Finance Companies Consumer Credit Outstanding, Credit 
Unions Consumer Credit Outstanding, Savings Institutions Consumer Credit Outstanding 
and Non-financial Business Consumer Credit Outstanding. 
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Figure 2 - 5 
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In Figure 2 - 5 the generalized impulse response functions for the response of the 
annualized quarterly growth rate of the GDP deflator to one standard deviation shocks to 
various credit ratio-to-income variables is given. The credit ratios are expressed in terms 
of quarterly averages. The credit variables are the following: Household Debt Service 
Ratio, Financial Obligations Ratio, Total Homeowner Financial Obligations Ratio, 
Homeowner Financial Obligations Ratio: Mortgage and Homeowner Financial 
Obligations Ratio: Consumer. 
 29 
 
Figure 2 - 6 
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In Figure 2 - 6 the generalized impulse response functions for the response of the 
annualized quarterly growth rate of the GDP deflator to one standard deviation shocks to 
various interest rate spreads are given. The interest rate spreads are expressed in terms of 
quarterly averages. The credit variables are the following spreads: Aaa-Federal Funds 
rate; Aaa-LIBOR; Aaa-10-year Treasury rate; Aaa-3-month Treasury bill rate; Baa-
Federal Funds rate; Baa-LIBOR; Baa-10-year Treasury rate; Baa-3-month Treasury bill 
rate; Credit Card-LIBOR; LIBOR-Federal Funds rate; and 24-month Personal Credit-
LIBOR. 
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Table 2 - 1 
Mean Median Maximum Minimum
Standard 
Deviation
Commodity Price 
Index
Annualized 
quarterly growth 
rate
3.05 2.54 18.12 -12.08 5.46 Federal Reserve 
Bank of St. Louis; 
PPIACO - 
Producer Price 
Index: All 
Commodities
Real GDP Annualized 
quarterly growth 
rate
2.85 2.92 8.92 -8.16 2.80
Federal Reserve 
Bank of St. Louis; 
GDPC1 - Real 
Gross Domestic 
Product, 1 
Decimal
GDP deflator Annualized 
quarterly growth 
rate
3.25 2.57 10.93 0.64 2.11 Federal Reserve 
Bank of St. Louis; 
GDPDEF - Gross 
Domestic Product: 
Implicit Price 
Deflator
Federal Funds 
effective rate
Quarterly average 6.56 5.68 17.78 1.00 3.69
Federal Reserve 
Bank of St. Louis; 
FEDFUNDS - 
Effective Federal 
Funds Rate
BAA Quarterly average 8.29 8.06 11.38 5.97 1.48 Federal Reserve 
Statistics: 
Selected Interest 
Rates
AAA Quarterly average 7.35 7.28 10.21 5.09 1.43 Federal Reserve 
Statistics: 
Selected Interest 
Rates
LIBOR Quarterly average 5.10 5.41 9.81 1.12 2.14 British Bankers' 
Association
3-month 
Treasury Bill
Quarterly average 4.43 4.86 8.54 0.30 1.95 Federal Reserve 
Statistics: 
Selected Interest 
Rates
10-year Treasury 
Constant Maturity 
Rate
Quarterly average 6.15 5.95 9.21 3.25 1.63 Federal Reserve 
Statistics: 
Selected Interest 
Rates
Commericial 
Bank Interest 
Rates: Terms of 
Credit
Quarterly average 15.55 15.75 18.51 11.87 2.11
Federal Reserve 
Statistics: 
Consumer Credit 
Commericial 
Bank Interest 
Rates: 24-month 
Personal Credit
Quarterly average 13.51 13.58 15.69 11.14 1.17
Federal Reserve 
Statistics: 
Consumer Credit 
Summary Statistics
Name Definition Source(s)
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Mean Median Maximum Minimum
Standard 
Deviation
Private Credit Annualized 
quarterly growth 
rate
5.65 6.43 45.89 -17.35 9.99 International 
Monetary Fund; 
Series Codes: 
11122D.ZF & 
11142D.ZF
Credit Market 
Debt 
Outstanding: 
Domestic, 
nonfinancial
Annualized 
quarterly growth 
rate
4.29 4.20 11.22 -2.51 2.21
Economagic 
webpage
Credit Market 
Debt 
Outstanding: 
Household, 
nonfinancial
Annualized 
quarterly growth 
rate
5.40 6.04 12.03 -3.13 3.63
Economagic 
webpage
Consumer Credit 
Outstanding: 
Total
Annualized 
quarterly growth 
rate
3.93 3.58 13.90 -6.79 4.41
Federal Reserve 
Statistics: 
Consumer Credit 
Commercial 
Bank Consumer 
Credit 
Outstanding
Annualized 
quarterly growth 
rate
2.28 2.59 17.01 -12.51 6.60
Federal Reserve 
Statistics: 
Consumer Credit 
Finance 
Companies 
Consumer Credit 
Outstanding
Annualized 
quarterly growth 
rate
4.73 5.34 44.87 -26.86 12.17
Federal Reserve 
Statistics: 
Consumer Credit 
Credit Unions 
Consumer Credit 
Outstanding
Annualized 
quarterly growth 
rate
2.66 2.61 22.31 -15.22 6.74
Federal Reserve 
Statistics: 
Consumer Credit 
Savings 
Institutions 
Consumer Credit 
Outstanding
Annualized 
quarterly growth 
rate
-0.70 1.61 39.42 -42.38 14.27
Federal Reserve 
Statistics: 
Consumer Credit 
Nonfinancial 
Business 
Consumer Credit 
Outstanding
Annualized 
quarterly growth 
rate
-2.93 -3.56 33.29 -68.84 15.11
Federal Reserve 
Statistics: 
Consumer Credit 
Household Debt 
Service Ratio 
Quarterly average 12.49 12.07 14.29 10.79 1.04 Economagic 
webpage
Financial 
Obligations Ratio
Quarterly average 17.81 17.62 19.39 16.16 0.89
Economagic 
webpage
Total 
Homeowner 
Financial 
Obligations Ratio
Quarterly average 26.50 26.24 31.26 23.41 1.91
Economagic 
webpage
Homeowner 
Financial 
Obligations 
Ratio: Mortgage 
Quarterly average 9.98 9.71 11.71 9.04 0.74
Economagic 
webpage
Homeowner 
Financial 
Obligations 
Ratio: Consumer 
Quarterly average 5.87 6.00 6.84 4.55 0.68
Economagic 
webpage
Name Definition
Summary Statistics
Source(s)
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Table 2 - 2 
Forecast 
Horizon Commodity real GDP Inflation Fed Funds Rate Private Credit
1 2.69 100.00 0.28 8.03 3.75
2 3.24 90.63 0.40 11.18 9.20
3 6.68 81.99 0.35 11.34 12.85
4 21.33 66.67 4.37 9.42 12.62
8 22.02 60.78 6.46 11.70 12.57
12 21.28 59.82 8.31 11.64 12.47
Forecast 
Horizon Commodity real GDP Inflation Fed Funds Rate
Consumer Credit 
Outstanding
1 2.56 100.00 0.39 9.00 1.11
2 3.61 95.22 0.36 10.00 1.22
3 6.91 84.25 0.33 12.61 2.09
4 22.52 67.10 4.95 10.32 1.66
8 22.41 62.68 6.27 13.68 1.66
12 21.55 61.45 7.32 13.18 2.57
Forecast 
Horizon Commodity real GDP Inflation Fed Funds Rate
Consumer Credit 
Outstanding 
(Commercial Banks)
1 4.80 100.00 0.16 10.36 0.00
2 4.79 90.95 0.14 9.71 4.78
3 7.92 82.76 0.14 12.47 4.40
4 23.70 67.11 3.66 10.18 3.51
8 23.76 59.90 5.36 13.41 5.45
12 23.08 59.53 5.86 13.33 5.63
Forecast 
Horizon Commodity real GDP Inflation Fed Funds Rate
Consumer Credit 
Outstanding (Finance 
Companies)
1 4.70 100.00 0.00 8.80 0.59
2 5.83 95.78 0.04 9.17 0.58
3 8.85 85.53 0.03 11.88 2.36
4 23.24 69.95 3.44 9.86 1.90
8 22.27 63.22 5.17 12.34 3.48
12 21.74 62.57 5.84 12.25 3.77
Forecast 
Horizon Commodity real GDP Inflation Fed Funds Rate
Consumer Credit 
Outstanding (Savings 
Institutions)
1 3.63 100.00 1.06 9.34 0.07
2 4.04 86.42 1.01 9.27 10.29
3 8.51 76.16 0.86 10.09 10.04
4 25.56 61.31 4.24 8.06 8.04
8 27.08 54.82 5.14 11.59 7.55
12 26.43 52.81 7.11 11.27 7.74
Forecast 
Horizon Commodity real GDP Inflation Fed Funds Rate
Consumer Credit 
Outstanding 
(Nonfinancial 
Businesses)
1 1.45 100.00 0.50 9.07 1.55
2 2.58 93.83 0.46 9.68 2.64
3 6.60 84.84 0.44 13.49 2.28
4 22.28 68.55 4.50 11.31 2.19
8 23.26 61.66 6.31 14.76 2.36
12 22.58 60.93 7.21 14.49 2.57
Variance Decomposition of real GDP
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Forecast 
Horizon Commodity real GDP Inflation Fed Funds Rate
Domestic, Non-financial 
Credit Market Debt
1 2.32 100.00 0.45 9.04 0.73
2 4.40 95.55 0.98 9.18 0.89
3 9.27 85.11 0.85 11.48 3.06
4 24.25 68.81 5.18 9.61 4.71
8 24.68 63.41 6.28 12.40 6.32
12 23.96 62.44 6.60 12.38 6.57
Forecast 
Horizon Commodity real GDP Inflation Fed Funds Rate
Non-financial Household  
Credit Market Debt
1 3.94 100.00 0.01 10.17 4.69
2 4.78 96.28 0.06 10.30 4.67
3 8.44 86.50 0.19 12.86 4.75
4 22.51 70.82 3.98 10.82 4.08
8 22.75 64.89 4.43 13.50 5.18
12 22.52 63.27 4.49 13.22 6.45
Forecast 
Horizon Commodity real GDP Inflation Fed Funds Rate
Consumer Credit 
Outstanding (Credit 
Unions)
1 1.45 100.00 0.50 9.07 1.55
2 2.58 93.83 0.46 9.68 2.64
3 6.60 84.84 0.44 13.49 2.28
4 22.28 68.55 4.50 11.31 2.19
8 23.26 61.66 6.31 14.76 2.36
12 22.58 60.93 7.21 14.49 2.57
Variance Decomposition of real GDP
 
In Table 2 - 2 the generalized variance decomposition of the annualized quarterly growth 
rate of real GDP under various VAR frameworks with different credit aggregates 
variables is given. The credit aggregates are also expressed in terms of annualized 
quarterly growth rate. The credit variables are the following: Private credit, Domestic, 
non-financial Credit Market Debt Outstanding, Household, non-financial Credit Market 
Debt Outstanding, Total Consumer Credit Outstanding, Commercial Bank Consumer 
Credit Outstanding, Finance Companies Consumer Credit Outstanding, Credit Unions 
Consumer Credit Outstanding, Savings Institutions Consumer Credit Outstanding and 
Non-financial Business Consumer Credit Outstanding. 
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Table 2 - 3 
Forecast 
Horizon Commodity real GDP Inflation Fed Funds Rate
Household Debt Service 
Ratio
1 3.49 100.00 1.29 7.27 6.03
2 3.98 86.66 1.18 6.95 14.28
3 7.26 79.24 1.08 9.72 12.71
4 18.62 67.40 5.11 8.50 11.17
8 21.41 60.41 6.09 11.24 11.07
12 20.86 59.55 6.79 10.98 10.74
Forecast 
Horizon Commodity real GDP Inflation Fed Funds Rate
Financial Obligations 
Ratio
1 3.18 100.00 1.28 7.36 5.88
2 3.89 87.83 1.26 7.24 12.82
3 7.29 80.35 1.15 9.84 11.39
4 19.38 68.03 5.39 8.50 10.52
8 21.77 60.98 6.46 11.27 10.43
12 21.20 59.88 7.27 11.06 10.28
Forecast 
Horizon Commodity real GDP Inflation Fed Funds Rate
Homeowner Financial 
Obligations Ratio
1 3.18 100.00 1.28 7.36 5.88
2 3.89 87.83 1.26 7.24 12.82
3 7.29 80.35 1.15 9.84 11.39
4 19.38 68.03 5.39 8.50 10.52
8 21.77 60.98 6.46 11.27 10.43
12 21.20 59.88 7.27 11.06 10.28
Forecast 
Horizon Commodity real GDP Inflation Fed Funds Rate
Homeowner Financial 
Obligations Ratio: 
Mortgage
1 3.09 100.00 1.44 7.38 4.66
2 3.90 89.15 1.38 7.18 11.06
3 7.17 81.82 1.37 9.82 9.75
4 18.97 69.53 5.30 8.60 8.40
8 21.30 62.73 6.19 10.75 9.85
12 20.74 61.61 7.77 10.37 9.59
Forecast 
Horizon Commodity real GDP Inflation Fed Funds Rate
Homeowner Financial 
Obligations Ratio: 
Consumer
1 3.14 100.00 1.51 7.75 4.49
2 4.06 90.17 1.48 7.73 9.30
3 8.24 81.17 1.30 10.04 8.22
4 22.10 67.18 5.52 8.43 7.84
8 23.20 61.66 6.74 11.32 7.32
12 22.66 60.94 7.36 11.21 7.13
Variance Decomposition of real GDP
 
In Table 2 - 3 the generalized variance decomposition of the annualized quarterly growth 
rate of real GDP under various VAR frameworks with different credit-to-income ratio 
variables is given. The credit ratios are expressed in terms of quarterly averages. The 
credit variables are the following: Household Debt Service Ratio, Financial Obligations 
Ratio, Total Homeowner Financial Obligations Ratio, Homeowner Financial Obligations 
Ratio: Mortgage and Homeowner Financial Obligations Ratio: Consumer. 
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Table 2 - 4 
Forecast 
Horizon Commodity real GDP Inflation Fed Funds Rate Aaa-FF spread
1 3.68 100.00 0.30 11.07 0.48
2 4.10 96.53 0.33 11.68 1.40
3 7.72 88.65 0.55 13.31 2.36
4 21.52 72.41 6.15 10.86 4.21
8 21.54 66.44 7.86 13.12 6.00
12 20.75 65.10 9.18 13.46 6.18
Forecast 
Horizon Commodity real GDP Inflation Fed Funds Rate Aaa-LIBOR spread
1 3.03 100.00 0.11 10.09 1.06
2 3.75 95.59 0.74 10.67 2.31
3 6.54 86.13 0.98 12.47 9.20
4 21.02 70.08 6.85 10.29 10.92
8 20.60 64.19 7.97 13.59 13.70
12 20.33 63.52 9.27 13.22 13.11
Forecast 
Horizon Commodity real GDP Inflation Fed Funds Rate
Aaa-10 year Treasury 
spread
1 3.76 100.00 0.00 8.25 13.91
2 3.92 89.19 0.01 10.82 14.39
3 8.27 80.22 0.02 11.33 17.03
4 28.21 62.14 5.41 8.69 13.02
8 30.59 53.29 6.85 11.86 13.53
12 29.93 52.85 7.75 11.75 13.44
Forecast 
Horizon Commodity real GDP Inflation Fed Funds Rate
Aaa-3 month T-bill 
spread
1 3.45 100.00 0.68 8.93 0.90
2 3.54 96.12 0.67 9.62 0.90
3 7.83 88.72 1.16 10.61 1.14
4 24.02 70.84 6.99 8.56 2.86
8 25.37 62.68 8.74 11.17 5.39
12 24.26 61.66 9.56 11.04 5.56
Forecast 
Horizon Commodity real GDP Inflation Fed Funds Rate Baa-FF spread
1 3.19 100.00 0.60 12.32 0.07
2 3.08 96.54 0.57 12.26 0.07
3 6.38 89.96 0.92 13.37 0.81
4 21.66 71.64 6.29 10.59 1.68
8 22.08 64.78 9.03 12.35 4.07
12 20.80 62.53 9.58 13.75 5.02
Forecast 
Horizon Commodity real GDP Inflation Fed Funds Rate Baa-LIBOR spread
1 3.04 100.00 0.29 12.65 6.05
2 3.59 96.57 0.77 13.17 5.98
3 5.22 88.04 1.01 14.74 12.35
4 20.03 71.09 7.23 11.89 11.44
8 19.98 65.37 9.04 13.66 13.49
12 19.36 64.35 10.01 13.82 13.29
Variance Decomposition of real GDP
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Forecast 
Horizon Commodity real GDP Inflation Fed Funds Rate
Baa-10 year Treasury 
spread
1 4.48 100.00 0.01 8.68 15.22
2 4.15 82.54 0.84 9.23 23.12
3 4.98 76.86 0.75 8.54 25.86
4 32.79 54.80 4.63 6.34 19.07
8 36.32 44.60 5.37 10.39 19.58
12 35.97 43.73 5.59 10.56 20.04
Forecast 
Horizon Commodity real GDP Inflation Fed Funds Rate
Baa-3 month T-bill 
spread
1 3.28 100.00 0.99 8.46 0.00
2 3.02 94.45 0.91 8.77 0.54
3 7.38 87.95 1.75 9.13 0.63
4 27.13 67.47 7.58 6.94 0.79
8 28.52 58.53 9.76 10.11 4.64
12 27.78 56.64 9.92 10.56 5.46
Forecast 
Horizon Commodity real GDP Inflation Fed Funds Rate
Credit Card-LIBOR 
spread
1 3.25 100.00 0.20 11.08 14.56
2 3.36 94.57 0.19 10.13 14.51
3 6.57 88.47 0.39 10.86 15.91
4 25.26 68.83 4.51 8.41 12.49
8 26.30 58.96 6.86 13.76 14.34
12 25.85 57.98 7.80 13.57 15.18
Forecast 
Horizon Commodity real GDP Inflation Fed Funds Rate LIBOR-FF spread
1 2.49 100.00 0.13 13.52 3.81
2 2.75 94.29 0.16 11.86 5.72
3 6.74 87.28 0.15 12.62 7.25
4 24.70 67.24 2.24 9.83 5.63
8 26.52 57.31 5.14 12.24 8.62
12 26.43 49.94 6.02 13.48 8.53
Forecast 
Horizon Commodity real GDP Inflation Fed Funds Rate
24-month Personal 
Credit-LIBOR spread
1 1.22 100.00 0.83 10.09 11.92
2 1.25 96.39 0.97 10.65 11.06
3 5.38 84.92 1.04 11.81 18.18
4 18.26 69.08 3.52 11.26 14.82
8 20.53 59.54 4.88 15.24 16.97
12 19.82 56.92 5.29 15.93 17.65
Variance Decomposition of real GDP
 
In Table 2 - 4 the generalized variance decomposition of the annualized quarterly growth 
rate of real GDP under various VAR frameworks with different interest rate spreads is 
given. The interest rate spreads are expressed in terms of quarterly averages. The credit 
variables are the following spreads: Aaa-Federal Funds rate; Aaa-LIBOR; Aaa-10-year 
Treasury rate; Aaa-3-month Treasury bill rate; Baa-Federal Funds rate; Baa-LIBOR; Baa-
10-year Treasury rate; Baa-3-month Treasury bill rate; Credit Card-LIBOR; LIBOR-
Federal Funds rate; and 24-month Personal Credit-LIBOR. 
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Table 2 - 5 
Forecast 
Horizon Commodity real GDP Inflation Fed Funds Rate Private Credit
1 12.35 0.28 100.00 1.57 0.00
2 21.06 5.88 87.57 7.77 0.00
3 18.80 5.35 77.67 10.25 2.40
4 18.71 6.87 78.06 9.52 2.23
8 12.60 16.80 66.66 10.36 5.56
12 11.64 20.12 63.73 9.39 5.18
Forecast 
Horizon Commodity real GDP Inflation Fed Funds Rate
Consumer Credit 
Outstanding
1 10.94 0.39 100.00 0.88 14.52
2 18.32 3.85 91.61 1.59 12.75
3 17.56 4.41 85.06 4.62 13.25
4 18.89 6.32 83.06 4.35 13.53
8 14.60 13.10 70.43 5.08 10.44
12 12.84 15.47 67.05 4.64 9.81
Forecast 
Horizon Commodity real GDP Inflation Fed Funds Rate
Consumer Credit 
Outstanding 
(Commercial Banks)
1 9.64 0.16 100.00 2.47 10.10
2 15.79 5.15 82.98 3.61 12.24
3 15.16 5.50 77.03 5.95 11.63
4 17.52 8.58 75.56 6.64 10.29
8 13.25 16.09 68.97 8.43 7.70
12 12.03 18.40 66.76 7.79 7.20
Forecast 
Horizon Commodity real GDP Inflation Fed Funds Rate
Consumer Credit 
Outstanding (Finance 
Companies)
1 7.29 0.00 100.00 2.55 1.37
2 16.11 6.12 88.39 4.85 1.41
3 15.15 6.74 78.50 7.22 5.40
4 16.72 9.47 76.01 6.65 5.40
8 13.53 15.88 64.46 8.84 4.06
12 12.02 18.98 61.35 8.25 3.93
Forecast 
Horizon Commodity real GDP Inflation Fed Funds Rate
Consumer Credit 
Outstanding (Savings 
Institutions)
1 10.93 1.06 100.00 1.14 0.03
2 19.07 1.94 92.62 1.92 0.91
3 17.67 1.85 85.35 4.81 5.04
4 16.98 3.92 81.34 4.51 7.36
8 13.01 8.25 68.85 5.36 8.78
12 12.33 9.36 63.64 5.20 10.13
Forecast 
Horizon Commodity real GDP Inflation Fed Funds Rate
Consumer Credit 
Outstanding 
(Nonfinancial 
Businesses)
1 11.63 0.50 100.00 2.44 4.92
2 17.09 2.66 93.82 2.66 4.50
3 16.44 3.52 86.10 5.28 5.68
4 18.02 5.40 83.09 5.19 5.37
8 13.49 12.91 70.26 6.78 4.85
12 12.15 15.08 67.34 6.14 5.01
Variance Decomposition of Inflation
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Forecast 
Horizon Commodity real GDP Inflation Fed Funds Rate
Domestic, Non-financial 
Credit Market Debt
1 10.78 0.45 100.00 3.43 24.38
2 15.94 3.16 89.61 3.78 21.55
3 15.02 3.09 84.59 7.33 20.27
4 15.35 4.73 81.76 7.46 18.18
8 14.04 9.27 68.35 9.20 15.58
12 13.55 9.51 63.95 8.66 15.70
Forecast 
Horizon Commodity real GDP Inflation Fed Funds Rate
Non-financial Household  
Credit Market Debt
1 7.45 0.01 100.00 2.18 14.12
2 20.37 5.93 81.37 3.33 12.55
3 18.72 5.98 69.10 10.64 12.33
4 15.73 7.43 64.20 8.83 13.30
8 14.73 15.35 42.79 10.59 19.05
12 17.75 16.11 33.96 9.23 24.36
Forecast 
Horizon Commodity real GDP Inflation Fed Funds Rate
Consumer Credit 
Outstanding (Credit 
Unions)
1 11.63 0.50 100.00 2.44 4.92
2 17.09 2.66 93.82 2.66 4.50
3 16.44 3.52 86.09 5.28 5.68
4 18.02 5.40 83.09 5.19 5.37
8 13.49 12.91 70.26 6.78 4.85
12 12.15 15.08 67.34 6.14 5.01
Variance Decomposition of Inflation
 
In Table 2 - 5 the generalized variance decomposition of the annualized quarterly growth 
rate of the GDP deflator with various credit aggregates variables is given. The credit 
aggregates are also expressed in terms of annualized quarterly growth rate. The credit 
variables are the following: Private credit, Domestic, non-financial Credit Market Debt 
Outstanding, Household, non-financial Credit Market Debt Outstanding, Total Consumer 
Credit Outstanding, Commercial Bank Consumer Credit Outstanding, Finance 
Companies Consumer Credit Outstanding, Credit Unions Consumer Credit Outstanding, 
Savings Institutions Consumer Credit Outstanding and Non-financial Business Consumer 
Credit Outstanding. 
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Table 2 - 6 
Forecast 
Horizon Commodity real GDP Inflation Fed Funds Rate
Household Debt Service 
Ratio
1 9.14 1.29 100.00 0.53 0.96
2 15.69 6.79 89.04 1.78 5.26
3 14.25 7.85 78.92 5.25 5.12
4 15.76 9.95 75.60 4.71 4.48
8 14.13 16.11 62.96 5.05 3.41
12 12.31 18.45 59.80 4.72 3.21
Forecast 
Horizon Commodity real GDP Inflation Fed Funds Rate
Financial Obligations 
Ratio
1 9.61 1.28 100.00 0.77 0.62
2 15.72 5.75 90.52 1.93 4.10
3 14.45 6.55 81.55 5.13 4.26
4 16.48 8.72 78.41 4.75 3.77
8 14.10 14.69 66.21 5.16 3.10
12 12.55 16.83 63.20 4.81 3.15
Forecast 
Horizon Commodity real GDP Inflation Fed Funds Rate
Homeowner Financial 
Obligations Ratio
1 9.61 1.28 100.00 0.77 0.62
2 15.72 5.75 90.52 1.93 4.10
3 14.45 6.55 81.55 5.13 4.26
4 16.48 8.72 78.41 4.75 3.77
8 14.10 14.69 66.21 5.16 3.10
12 12.55 16.83 63.20 4.81 3.15
Forecast 
Horizon Commodity real GDP Inflation Fed Funds Rate
Homeowner Financial 
Obligations Ratio: 
Mortgage
1 11.31 1.44 100.00 0.63 0.02
2 20.64 6.76 86.97 1.86 2.87
3 19.38 7.84 74.24 6.55 3.59
4 21.04 9.54 70.37 5.65 3.77
8 17.71 16.33 61.91 4.85 2.98
12 16.39 18.81 57.65 4.70 3.69
Forecast 
Horizon Commodity real GDP Inflation Fed Funds Rate
Homeowner Financial 
Obligations Ratio: 
Consumer
1 10.46 1.51 100.00 1.27 1.56
2 15.50 5.22 89.83 2.71 7.73
3 14.41 5.54 82.85 5.35 7.54
4 16.77 7.76 79.88 5.07 7.01
8 14.03 12.79 66.45 5.94 5.18
12 12.21 14.86 63.00 5.52 4.54
Variance Decomposition of Inflation
 
In Table 2 - 6 the generalized variance decomposition of the annualized quarterly growth 
rate of the GDP deflator under various VAR frameworks with different credit-to-income 
ratio variables is given. The credit ratios are expressed in terms of quarterly averages. 
The credit variables are the following: Household Debt Service Ratio, Financial 
Obligations Ratio, Total Homeowner Financial Obligations Ratio, Homeowner Financial 
Obligations Ratio: Mortgage and Homeowner Financial Obligations Ratio: Consumer. 
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Table 2 - 7 
Forecast 
Horizon Commodity real GDP Inflation Fed Funds Rate Aaa-FF spread
1 11.45 0.30 100.00 1.45 0.41
2 22.76 4.49 86.79 2.86 0.91
3 21.94 4.83 79.37 6.47 4.50
4 21.84 6.08 78.88 6.48 4.55
8 17.11 13.43 69.43 7.29 3.56
12 16.12 15.31 66.11 6.80 5.89
Forecast 
Horizon Commodity real GDP Inflation Fed Funds Rate Aaa-LIBOR spread
1 13.37 0.11 100.00 1.50 2.37
2 22.59 2.86 89.22 2.54 2.44
3 21.55 3.16 81.64 6.13 8.89
4 23.52 4.75 80.54 6.34 8.16
8 18.06 13.63 71.77 6.58 6.11
12 17.04 15.67 67.77 6.00 8.39
Forecast 
Horizon Commodity real GDP Inflation Fed Funds Rate
Aaa-10 year Treasury 
spread
1 12.01 0.00 100.00 3.46 9.60
2 20.79 4.95 88.86 5.99 9.03
3 20.42 6.06 82.20 7.72 8.22
4 21.26 8.83 79.21 8.39 7.46
8 15.28 18.30 68.24 10.49 10.62
12 13.94 22.54 62.62 10.12 9.53
Forecast 
Horizon Commodity real GDP Inflation Fed Funds Rate
Aaa-3 month T-bill 
spread
1 11.35 0.68 100.00 0.34 0.05
2 22.08 4.45 86.50 1.59 0.96
3 21.64 5.46 80.28 4.22 2.93
4 20.46 6.33 77.80 4.29 4.70
8 16.42 13.66 67.78 5.32 3.98
12 18.12 15.23 62.34 5.47 5.78
Forecast 
Horizon Commodity real GDP Inflation Fed Funds Rate Baa-FF spread
1 11.36 0.60 100.00 1.18 0.45
2 22.67 4.52 86.92 2.46 2.31
3 21.57 4.53 79.80 6.53 4.92
4 21.27 5.22 79.60 6.67 4.55
8 15.74 12.71 70.49 8.09 4.28
12 15.67 14.25 66.28 7.84 5.79
Forecast 
Horizon Commodity real GDP Inflation Fed Funds Rate Baa-LIBOR spread
1 12.71 0.29 100.00 1.11 0.18
2 22.03 3.06 89.52 2.45 1.97
3 20.53 2.90 82.25 6.64 7.69
4 22.53 4.09 81.19 7.14 7.20
8 17.12 12.69 72.29 7.97 7.29
12 16.76 14.26 68.19 7.56 8.30
Variance Decomposition of Inflation
  
 41 
Forecast 
Horizon Commodity real GDP Inflation Fed Funds Rate
Baa-10 year Treasury 
spread
1 10.30 0.00 100.00 3.30 16.68
2 15.63 3.34 91.56 6.81 16.62
3 14.90 3.52 86.76 8.76 15.72
4 18.58 6.24 82.76 10.90 16.23
8 15.39 15.33 72.06 12.12 19.33
12 14.62 16.32 65.02 11.05 19.22
Forecast 
Horizon Commodity real GDP Inflation Fed Funds Rate
Baa-3 month T-bill 
spread
1 11.33 0.99 100.00 0.39 1.39
2 22.11 4.68 86.73 1.51 3.72
3 21.36 5.36 80.43 4.75 4.65
4 20.01 5.57 78.39 4.69 5.30
8 16.63 13.10 66.54 6.07 6.24
12 21.18 14.55 58.04 7.02 7.51
Forecast 
Horizon Commodity real GDP Inflation Fed Funds Rate
Credit Card-LIBOR 
spread
1 11.99 0.20 100.00 1.48 0.01
2 19.18 2.34 93.27 2.54 0.62
3 19.73 3.11 86.11 4.78 2.29
4 21.91 5.66 83.30 4.97 2.97
8 17.24 11.65 74.17 6.23 2.55
12 15.52 12.75 70.96 5.63 3.22
Forecast 
Horizon Commodity real GDP Inflation Fed Funds Rate LIBOR-FF spread
1 10.69 0.13 100.00 2.67 4.14
2 17.24 2.24 93.19 5.32 4.20
3 19.63 3.60 82.51 5.56 9.49
4 23.01 6.06 78.98 6.01 10.42
8 14.09 11.24 54.01 11.32 9.43
12 14.08 12.97 47.17 12.23 7.58
Forecast 
Horizon Commodity real GDP Inflation Fed Funds Rate
24-month Personal 
Credit-LIBOR spread
1 12.01 0.83 100.00 1.64 0.33
2 18.38 2.53 91.94 2.65 2.70
3 18.74 2.79 84.96 5.52 2.81
4 21.87 4.33 81.93 5.86 4.29
8 17.25 12.11 71.75 8.56 6.03
12 14.76 14.15 66.31 8.88 5.32
Variance Decomposition of Inflation
  
In Table 2 - 7 the generalized variance decomposition of the annualized quarterly growth 
rate of the GDP deflator under various VAR frameworks with different interest rate 
spreads is given. The interest rate spreads are expressed in terms of quarterly averages. 
The credit variables are the following spreads: Aaa-Federal Funds rate; Aaa-LIBOR; 
Aaa-10-year Treasury rate; Aaa-3-month Treasury bill rate; Baa-Federal Funds rate; Baa-
LIBOR; Baa-10-year Treasury rate; Baa-3-month Treasury bill rate; Credit Card-LIBOR; 
LIBOR-Federal Funds rate; and 24-month Personal Credit-LIBOR. 
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CHAPTER 3. REAL INTEREST RATES AND FISCAL POLICY: 
A GLOBAL STUDY  
3.1 INTRODUCTION  
In the forefront of every nation's fiscal policy debate exists the issue of whether to run a budget 
deficit or a budget surplus. Given that the latter is rarely attained by most countries, the debate 
then reduces to one that concerns the size of the budget deficit. One of the arguments given 
against increasing the magnitude of a budget deficit is the cost that will be incurred by the 
economy from a resulting increase in the real interest rate. When government spending grows 
more than government receipts, the private sector pays the price through an increase in real 
interest rates in response to the lower pool of loanable funds available to the economy. Recently, 
this debate has garnered more attention given that the U.S. has gone from having a rare budget 
surplus to the more typical budget deficit. Other nations have seen similar fluctuations.  
 Gale and Orszag (2004) give a thorough overview of the different economic effects of 
budget deficits on real interest rates. They present two theoretical views: a Ricardian equivalence 
explanation and a Keynesian IS-LM explanation. Barro (1974) shows that if Ricardian 
equivalence prevails, national savings will always be constant, regardless of national deficits. If a 
government is operating under a national deficit, private savings will increase in anticipation of 
future tax increases or lower government spending. The change in the national budget will then 
be offset by an equal change in private savings. Since national savings provide the pool of 
loanable funds to the economy, there will be no change in the real interest rate. The Keynesian 
IS-LM view, however, implies that Ricardian equivalence might fail. Under this explanation, 
private savings does not completely offset changes in the national budget. In a closed economy, 
the real interest rate responds sharply to changes in the national budget, since national savings 
cannot expand through capital inflows. If the economy is an open one, it is possible that national 
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savings can expand through capital inflows or shrink if domestic capital goes abroad. If fiscal 
policy is expansionary, the real interest rate will increase. The new higher real interest rate will 
attract foreign capital. This new source of capital will expand the pool of loanable funds and 
drive down the real interest rate. Whether the real interest rate returns to its original level or not 
will depend on the degree of financial openness that exists in the economy in question. In the 
Keynesian IS-LM view, exchange rate regimes are important as well. While they will not change 
the type of response in the real interest rate, a floating or fixed currency will affect the magnitude 
of their response. A fixed currency will dampen this effect since the central bank will have to 
adjust the money supply in order to offset the change in the real interest rate and maintain their 
currency at a constant value. 
 Empirically, most findings support the Keynesian view. Changes in the national budget 
affect real interest rates. Using a measure of projected deficits to control for business cycle 
effects, Laubach (2003) finds that an increase in the deficit-GDP ratio by one percent raises the 
ten-year Treasury note by at least 24 basis points. Engen and Hubbard (2004) duplicate the 
Laubach study, but with more control variables; at 18 basis points, they find the same directional 
effect but of a much smaller magnitude. In an international study Ardagna, Caselli and Lane 
(2004) find that for OECD countries a one-percent increase in the national deficit-GDP ratio 
results in a cumulative change of 150 basis points for the real interest rate, while the one-time, 
initial increase is approximately 10 basis points. 
 I use a dynamic panel data set of 59 nations from 1970 through 2006. I control for both 
exchange rate regimes and financial openness. As in the previous literature, I find that fiscal 
policy affects real interest rates, but not as much as previous studies would suggest. A one-
percent increase in the national deficit to national output ratio in real terms increases that 
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nation’s real interest rate. The effect is statistically and economically significant. The benchmark 
result ranges in magnitude from around 12 to 15 basis points, depending on which measure of 
financial openness is used. This study is unique in that it covers a range of very different nations. 
It is not limited to nations with similar economies, rather it encompasses both advanced, 
developed and transitional economies. 
 A second finding is the apparent unimportance of financial openness. At no stage is the 
financial openness variable statistically significant in the determination of the real interest rate. 
This result does not change when using a de jure measure of financial openness instead of a de 
facto one. While this appears to be a puzzling result, it is not entirely so. In economic growth 
literature Fratzscher and Bussière (2004) document the failed efforts in the literature to quantify 
financial openness effects on economic growth. 
The section that follows goes over the methodology and data set used in this study. 
Section 3.3 provides a discussion of the results. Section 3.4 provides some robustness checks and 
the final section of this chapter concludes. 
3.2 METHODOLOGY AND DATA 
In an effort to analyze the behavior of real interest rates when faced with changes in national 
budgets among a variety of nations, I make adjustments to an empirical model given by Giavazzi 
et al. (2000) and Kamps (2006). I assume that the real interest rate depends on the growth rate of 
per capita income and the ratio of the budget surplus to GDP. The model is dynamic due to the 
fact that I also assume that there is persistence in the real interest rate, so lagged values of the 
real interest rate are included.
19
 I also control for financial openness and exchange rate regimes. 
                                                 
19
 For example, see Rapach and Wohar (2004) concerning real interest rate persistence. 
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3.2.1 Pooled OLS 
The general specification of the model assumes n lags of the dependent variable and is given as 
follows: 
  it
p
n
nitnitititititit rxchfossyr
1
43210 )(   (1) 
Here, r stands for the real interest rate, y is the growth in per capita income, s is the national 
budget-to-GDP ratio. Positive values of s indicate a budget surplus, while negative ones imply a 
national deficit. The variable fo is a measure of financial openness and xch is a binary variable 
that captures whether the ith country's exchange rate regime is floating or fixed by assigning a 
value of 1 for the former and 0 for the latter. Of course, t is a time subscript, i is the country 
subscript and n is the lag length. Also, as given by Equation 1, I assume that financial openness 
interacts with the national budget to affect the real interest rate. 
3.2.2 Fixed Effects 
Given the range of countries being examined and the time period being covered, certain specific 
effects would be expected. These may be sensitive to either country factors and/or time factors. 
If the individual country effects are due to variables being omitted, then, it is possible that there 
could be correlation issues with the other independent variables. Additionally, since the sample 
of countries used in this study is not truly random, controlling for fixed effects would seem more 
appropriate.
20
 To account for this, the above model will be estimated again, but in the following 
manner: 
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20
 The Hausman test confirms this. 
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Country fixed effects and time fixed effects are controlled for using dummy variables (not shown 
here for convenience) and are represented by the additional vectors δ and η, respectively. 
3.2.3 Arellano-Bond Estimator 
Since the dependent variable r depends on past values of r, dynamic effects need to be accounted 
for. However, allowing for a lags of the dependent variable on the right-hand side of the equation 
potentially could lead to an endogeneity problem. With this in mind and in order to obtain 
consistent parameters for this model and address the potential endogeneity issue, following 
Arellano and Bond (1991) a generalized method-of-moments (GMM) approach is used to 
estimate the parameters. First-differencing Equation 2 above gives the following: 
 t
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 The individual country and time effects are now eliminated and estimation can be done 
using GMM procedures. For the dependent variable, the Arellano-Bond estimator calls for using 
the lagged variable rt-2 as an instrument and for the independent variables, their own differences 
are used as in Equation 3. So, following Arellano-Bond, the equation to be estimated is: 
t
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 Given the assumption that there tends to be some degree of persistence in the real interest 
rate, one would expect past values of r to be positively correlated with current values; therefore, 
αp should be positive and statistically significant. Also, if β1 is statistically significant, it should 
be positive, given that theory would suggest that increases in per capita income drive the real 
interest rate up through higher demand for money. The sign of β2 should be negative if it is 
significant; this would confirm Keynesian IS-LM behavior of real interest rates in response to 
changes in the national budget. However, if this parameter is not statistically different from zero, 
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then Ricardian equivalence would appear to prevail. The parameter β3 for the interaction variable 
(s*fo) should be positive if financial openness is important, since financial openness will offset 
the national budget effect on real interest rates by providing capital when shortages in the 
loanable funds market occur and vice versa. At first glance, it is not clear what the expected sign 
of the coefficient β5 should be. Since central banks in countries with fixed exchange rates use 
monetary policy to offset changes in the interest rate, it could be either sign. Fortunately, this 
will not matter since the purpose of including it here is simply to control for different currency 
regimes.  
3.2.4 Data 
The data for this study is annual and covers the period from 1970 through 2006.
21
 The lag used 
for the real interest rate independent variable is one.
22
 The real interest rate is calculated by 
subtracting the inflation rate from the national treasury bill rate. The inflation rate is calculated 
using the consumer price index of each country. The real per capita GDP growth rate is obtained  
from each country's GDP series, population series and consumer price index. The national 
budget ratio is calculated using each country's surplus/deficit series and GDP series. Following 
Edison et al. (2002), the de facto financial openness series is a ratio of the country's capital 
inflows and outflows to GDP. All of the above series are taken from the International Monetary 
Fund's International Financial Statistics database. The de jure financial openness index is taken 
from the Chinn-Ito index.
23
 The exchange rate information was taken from the IMF De Facto 
Exchange Rate Arrangements and Anchors of Monetary Policy. 
                                                 
21
 See Table 3 - 12  for a list of the countries included in this paper and see Table 3 - 13 for the summary statistics 
for the data. 
22
 Running the regressions with two or more lags does not change the results significantly and furthermore the 
second lag is insignificant statistically. 
23
 The latest version of this index can be found at http://www.ssc.wisc.edu/~mchinn. 
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3.3 DISCUSSION OF RESULTS 
3.3.1 Fiscal Policy, Real Interest Rates and de jure Financial Openness 
The first column of Table 3 - 1 shows the results from the pooled OLS estimation using the de 
jure financial openness variable. At first glance, these benchmark results would appear to 
support Ricardian equivalence; that is, fiscal policy is not important in the determination of real 
interest rates. But, if this were the case, the financial openness variable should not matter either. 
Here, it does. However, while the financial openness variable is statistically significant, 
economically its effect on real interest rates is small. It does have the expected sign, since the 
coefficient's positive sign would indicate that financial openness improves the real interest rate 
impact, but economically, this is very small at 2 basis points. The coefficients for the other 
regressors are significant and as expected. 
 In all likelihood, the pooled OLS estimation is not adequate. Given the wide sample and 
broad time period, one would expect some sort of fixed effects to occur. In the second column of 
Table 3 - 1 the results from estimating Equation 2 are given. Controlling for both time and 
country fixed effects suggests that fiscal policy does matter both statistically and economically. 
A one-percent change in the national budget to GDP ratio corresponds to a 12 basis point change 
in the real interest rate, regardless of country or time period. If a country increases its national 
deficit by one percent relative to its GDP, an increase of 12 basis points in the real interest rate 
would be expected. This estimate is higher than the estimate given by Ardagna, Caselli and Lane 
(2004), but a bit less than Laubach's (2003) and Engen and Hubbard's (2004). 
 While the short-run effect found by Ardagna, Caselli and Lane (2004) was not of great 
magnitude, they did find that the long-run effect was prominent at 150 basis points after 10 
years. Assuming that the financial openness coefficient is not statistically different from zero as 
the results indicate, based on the results from column two of Table 3 - 1, the long-run effect of a 
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change in the national budget would approach approximately 16 basis points. This is illustrated 
in Figure 3 - 1. This effect would be permanent, but small compared to the 150 basis point effect 
in Ardagna, Caselli and Lane (2004). 
 Due to the fact that a lag of the dependent variable appears as an independent variable, 
controlling just for fixed effects may not be sufficient. Instrumenting and using the GMM 
technique as given by Arellano and Bond (1991), fiscal policy appears to matter a bit more. 
Statistically, the coefficient for the budget surplus variable is stronger. Economically, the basis 
point impact on the real interest rate is slightly more at 15 basis points. Looking at Figure 3 - 2, 
the long-run effect is also greater at just under 20 basis points after 10 years. This effect is 
permanent and asymptotically approaches 20 basis points. 
 In both the fixed effects and the GMM regressions, what stands out is that the coefficient 
for financial openness is never statistically significant. In all cases the control variables are 
important and they have the signs that are expected. 
3.3.2 Fiscal Policy, Real Interest Rates and de facto Financial Openness 
In Table 3 - 2 the results from the pooled OLS estimation using the de facto financial openness 
variable are given. As in the de jure case, fiscal policy does not seem to matter, however, neither 
does financial openness. Of the control variables only the currency regime and the one-year lag 
of the real interest rate appear important statistically. 
 As stated earlier, the pooled OLS estimation does not seem appropriate. Using two-way 
fixed effects for country and time, results similar to those in the de jure fixed effects regression 
are obtained. Financial openness is the only variable that does not appear to matter statistically. 
The other coefficients are all of similar magnitudes and statistical significance levels as those 
results using the de jure financial openness variable. The one-time basis point effect of an 
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increase in the national deficit on the real interest rate is approximately 15 basis points. The 
long-term effect is around 16.25 basis points as given in Figure 3 - 3. 
 Under the Arellano-Bond estimation, the statistical significance and economic magnitude 
are similar. In other words, fiscal policy appears to matter, but financial openness does not. Here, 
the basis point increase in the real interest rate from a one-percentage increase in the deficit-to-
GDP ratio is approximately 13 basis points. The long-term effect approaches 20 basis points as 
shown in Figure 3 - 4. 
3.4 SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS 
The results above are not sensitive to lag selection. A lag length of one seems to be the most 
appropriate, but additionally lags of the dependent variable have no effect on the results that the 
budget surplus variable is negatively correlated to the real interest rate and that the financial 
openness variable has no effect. 
 Excluding the exchange rate variable does not change the results for either financial 
openness variable and for either estimation technique. 
 Also, sub-sample data sets also support the finding that financial openness does not 
appear to be important in the determination of real interest rates. The first two rows of Table 3 - 
3 and Table 3 - 4 show the results for sub-sample analysis based on whether a country is 
industrial or not. The results in the third row are from examining countries that are members of 
the OECD.
24
 However, only in the sub-sample for non-industrial countries is the national budget 
variable important. 
 In the previous analysis, correlation between the lagged dependent variable and the error 
term is not taken into consideration. When this is accounted for by using the Arellano-Bond 
                                                 
24
 Not all countries of the OECD are in the original sample. Here, only the countries from this sample that are in the 
OECD are looked at.  
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estimator, the two original results are both supported: the national budget is statistically 
important in the determination of real interest rates and financial openness does not appear to 
matter for real interest rates. This is shown in Table 3 - 5 and Table 3 - 6. 
 Next, I drop all sub-Saharan nations, except for South Africa. The results are given in the 
fourth rows of Table 3 - 3 through Table 3 - 6. Again, the results are robust. The magnitude and 
sign of the effect of budget surplus variable on the real interest rate is approximately the same. 
Additionally, the coefficient for financial openness in all specifications is insignificant 
statistically. 
 In Table 3 - 7 and Table 3 - 8 I use different GMM estimators with different 
specifications. Again, the results are robust. The budget surplus coefficient is statistically and 
economically significant, while the financial openness variable remains statistically insignificant. 
 Finally, in Table 3 - 9 and Table 3 - 10 I conduct the Sargan test using the Arellano-Bond 
estimator. For both financial openness variables the Sargan test provides a p-value greater than 
the significance level of 0.05. Therefore, I do not reject the null hypothesis of instrument 
exogeneity and I conclude that the instruments are not correlated with the error term. I also 
conduct the Sargan test for lags of the dependent variable greater than one. With the exception of 
a lag of two, all higher order lags do not allow for rejection of the null hypothesis of 
overidentifying restrictions being valid. The instruments appear to be exogenous. Additionally, 
in Table 3 - 11, I report the Arellano-Bond test for autocorrelation in the first-differenced errors. 
I reject the null hypothesis of serial correlation in the first-differenced error terms at an order 
higher than one; this implies that the moment conditions used by the Arellano-Bond estimator 
are valid. 
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3.5 CONCLUDING REMARKS 
While Ricardian equivalence suggests that fiscal policy has no effect in the determination of the 
real interest rate, most empirical evidence suggests otherwise. However, even though the 
literature appears to support the Keynesian IS-LM hypothesis that fiscal policy matters for real 
interest rates, there is often much disagreement over the degree of economic importance. Most of 
the focus on this issue is centered on the U.S. economy. The one study that has looked beyond 
the U.S. was limited to OECD countries that are similar to the U.S.  
Here, I test the link between fiscal policy and real interest rates on a much broader 
sample. I look at developed, developing and transitional economies. Controlling for exchange 
rate regimes and financial openness, I find evidence that supports the Keynesian IS-LM 
hypothesis, but only slightly. While fiscal policy is statistically and economically important in 
the determination of real interest rates, in this study I find the effect to be smaller than estimated 
in previous studies, both in the short run and in the long run. Increases in the national deficit to 
GDP ratio are linked positively with changes in the real interest rate. I find that the strongest 
effect is in the short-run. This effect ranges from 12 to 15 basis points. However, after 
approximately 5 years, the effect approaches its maximum level of around 16 to 20 basis points. 
Therefore, the long-run effect is not as important. 
Additionally, I find a surprising result: financial openness does not appear to play an 
important role in the determination of real interest rates. This result is robust to country selection 
and two different measures of financial openness. This result is truly puzzling. Possible 
explanations are that current measures of financial openness suffer from measurement error 
and/or the degree of financial openness in the world is close among different economies and 
therefore due to a lack of variation it does not appear to have much explanatory power for the 
determination of real interest rates. Also, it may be the case that trade openness better captures 
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financial openness than conventional measures of financial openness do. Another possible 
explanation is that institutional quality is not captured. If institutions are weak, then the degree of 
financial openness in a country will not matter since it will lack proper institutions to allow for 
this mechanism of capital flows to function properly. 
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3.6 APPENDIX 
Table 3 - 1 
 
Standard errors are given in parenthesis. Bold face indicates 
coefficients have -value less than or equal to 0.10 (*** ≤ 0.01; 
** ≤ 0.05; * ≤ 0.10). There are 52 observations for the first 
two columns and 680 for the last one.  
 
 
Table 3 - 2 
 
Standard errors are given in parenthesis. Bold face indicates 
coefficients have -value less than or equal to 0.10 (*** ≤ 0.01; 
** ≤ 0.05; * ≤ 0.10). There are 752 observations for the first 
two columns and 680 for the last one.  
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Table 3 - 3 
-0.04 0.004
(0.05) (0.02)
-0.13** -0.05
(0.07) (0.04)
-0.01 0.002
(0.05) (0.02)
-0.10** -0.04
(0.05) (0.03)
De jure Sensitivity Analysis (FE)
National Budget
Financial 
Openness
Industrial 
Countries
No Industrial 
Countries
OECD Countries 
in sample
No Sub-Saharan 
Countries  
Standard errors are given in parenthesis. Bold face indicates 
coefficients have p-value less than or equal to 0.10 (*** ≤ 
0.01; ** ≤ 0.05; * ≤ 0.10). There are 316 observations for the 
first row, 436 for the second, 306 for the third row and 757 for 
the last row.  
 
 
 
 
Table 3 - 4 
-0.04 0.0000
(0.05) (0.0004)
-0.18*** 0.0001
(0.07) (0.0004)
-0.03 0.002
(0.05) (0.002)
-0.13*** 0.000
(0.04) (0.000)
National Budget
Financial 
Openness
De facto Sensitivity Analysis (FE)
Industrial 
Countries
No Industrial 
Countries
OECD Countries 
in sample
No Sub-Saharan 
Countries  
Standard errors are given in parenthesis. Bold face indicates 
coefficients have p-value less than or equal to 0.10 (*** ≤ 
0.01; ** ≤ 0.05; * ≤ 0.10). There are 316 observations for the 
first row, 436 for the second, 306 for the third row and 757 for 
the last row.  
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Table 3 - 5 
-0.11** 0.02
(0.05) (0.02)
-0.15** -0.02
(0.07) (0.04)
-0.08** 0.009
(0.05) (0.02)
-0.13** -0.02
(0.06) (0.03)
Industrial 
Countries
No Industrial 
Countries
OECD Countries 
in sample
No Sub-Saharan 
Countries
De jure Sensitivity Analysis (GMM)
National Budget
Financial 
Openness
 
Standard errors are given in parenthesis. Bold face indicates 
coefficients have p-value less than or equal to 0.10 (*** ≤ 
0.01; ** ≤ 0.05; * ≤ 0.10). There are 295 observations for the 
first row, 385 for the second, 283 for the third row and 682 for 
the last row.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 3 - 6 
-0.10** 0.0001
(0.04) (0.0004)
-0.19*** 0.0003
(0.07) (0.0005)
-0.10** 0.003
(0.05) (0.002)
-0.14*** -0.000
(0.05) (0.000)
Industrial 
Countries
No Industrial 
Countries
OECD Countries 
in sample
No Sub-Saharan 
Countries
De facto Sensitivity Analysis (GMM)
National Budget
Financial 
Openness
 
Standard errors are given in parenthesis. Bold face indicates 
coefficients have p-value less than or equal to 0.10 (*** ≤ 
0.01; ** ≤ 0.05; * ≤ 0.10). There are 295 observations for the 
first row, 385 for the second, 283 for the third row and 682 for 
the last row.  
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Table 3 - 7 
-0.14*** -0.01
(0.05) (0.03)
-0.11** -0.01
(0.05) (0.03)
-0.14*** -0.01
(0.05) (0.03)
De jure Sensitivity Analysis (Other Estimators)
National Budget
Financial 
Openness
Blundell-Bond Estimator
Arellano-Bond with strictly exogenous 
covariates
Arellano-Bover/Blundell-Bond Estimator 
with strictly exogenous covariates  
Standard errors are given in parenthesis. Bold face indicates 
coefficients have p-value less than or equal to 0.10 (*** ≤ 
0.01; ** ≤ 0.05; * ≤ 0.10). There are 752 observations for each 
row.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 3 - 8 
-0.14*** 0.000
(0.05) (0.000)
-0.12** -0.000
(0.05) (0.000)
-0.14*** 0.000
(0.05) (0.000)
Blundell-Bond Estimator
Arellano-Bond with strictly exogenous 
covariates
Arellano-Bover/Blundell-Bond Estimator 
with strictly exogenous covariates
De facto Sensitivity Analysis (Other Estimators)
National Budget
Financial 
Openness
 
Standard errors are given in parenthesis. Bold face indicates 
coefficients have p-value less than or equal to 0.10 (*** ≤ 
0.01; ** ≤ 0.05; * ≤ 0.10). There are 752 observations for each 
row. 
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Table 3 - 9 
-0.13** -0.02
(0.06) (0.03)
-0.13** -0.01
(0.06) (0.03)
-0.15** 0.01
(0.06) (0.03)
0.12
P-value
Sargan Test (de jure )
0.05
0.00
National Budget to 
GDP ratio
Financial 
Openness
One lag
Two lags
Three lags
 
 
 
Table 3 - 10 
-0.15*** 0.0002
(0.05) (0.0004)
-0.14*** -0.00004
(0.05) (0.0004)
-0.14*** -0.00001
(0.05) (0.0004)
0.13
P-value
Sargan Test (de facto )
0.05
0.00
National Budget to 
GDP ratio
Financial 
Openness
One lag
Two lags
Three lags
 
 
 
Table 3 - 11 
Order 1 Order 2
De facto Financial 
Openness
0.0007 0.9793
Autocorrelation Tests
P-value
De jure  Financial 
Openness
0.0007 0.9641
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Table 3 - 12 
Australia Iceland Philippines
Bahamas Israel Poland
Bahrain Italy Seychelles
Barbados Jamaica Singapore
Belgium Kenya Slovenia
Belize Kuwait South Africa
Bolivia Kyrgyz Rep. Spain
Brazil Latvia Sri Lanka
Canada Lesotho St. Kitts & Nevis
Cyprus Lithuania St. Lucia
Czech Rep. Malawi Swaziland
Egypt Malaysia Sweden
Ethiopia Malta Switzerland
Fiji Mexico Thailand
France Moldova Trinidad & Tobago
Germany Morocco Uganda
Greece Nepal United Kingdom
Grenada Netherlands United States
Haiti New Zealand Zambia
Hungary Papua N. Guinea
Countries in sample
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Table 3 - 13 
 
Observations: 833
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Figure 3 - 1 
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The above graph shows the outcome of a one-percentage point 
increase in the deficit-to-GDP ratio on the real interest rate 
using results from de jure fixed effect estimation. 
 
 
 
Figure 3 - 2 
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The above graph shows the outcome of a one-percentage point 
increase in the deficit-to-GDP ratio on the real interest rate 
using results from de jure GMM estimation. 
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Figure 3 - 3 
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The above graph shows the outcome of a one-percentage point 
increase in the deficit-to-GDP ratio on the real interest rate 
using results from de facto fixed effect estimation. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3 - 4 
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The above graph shows the outcome of a one-percentage point 
increase in the deficit-to-GDP ratio on the real interest rate 
using results from de facto GMM estimation. 
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CHAPTER 4. MEXICAN STOCK EXCHANGE REACTION TO 
US MONETARY SURPRISES  
4.1 INTRODUCTION  
The Federal Reserve announcement concerning the federal funds target rate is one of the most 
important news items concerning monetary policy in the world. For U.S. equity markets, 
numerous studies have shown that the U.S. stock market is responsive to changes in U.S. 
monetary policy.
25
 For foreign markets, U.S. monetary policy impact on foreign exchange rates 
and foreign interest rates has been examined in the literature as well.
26
 The impact of Federal 
Open Market Committee (FOMC) announcements on foreign equity indices is looked at by 
Johnson and Jensen (1993), Ehrmann and Fratzscher (2002, 2006), Ehrmann et al (2005) and 
Wongswan (2005, 2006). In this literature it is shown that some of the reaction from foreign 
equity indices to US monetary policy is both direct and indirect; in addition to reacting to US 
monetary policy, foreign equity indices react through the U.S. equity market as well. 
 However, one issue that has received less attention is the importance of business cycles in 
determining the magnitude of the equity market reaction to monetary policy. Basistha and Kurov 
(2008) look at U.S. equity market reactions to the surprise component from FOMC 
announcements. They find that U.S. equity market reactions are more pronounced when the U.S. 
economy is in a recession. Using Granger causality statistics, Rodriguez and Rowe (2007) find 
that U.S. monetary policy can impact Hong Kong GDP and they suggest that if Hong Kong were 
in a recession, given that Fed policy is exongenous to the Hong Kong GDP, FOMC 
                                                 
25
 See Jensen and Johnson (1995), Jensen et al (1996), Thorbecke (1997), Patelis (1997), Ehrmann and Fratzscher 
(2004), Rigobon and Sack (2004), Gurkaynak et al (2004), and Bernanke and Kuttner (2005). 
26
 Husted and Kitchen (1985), Roley (1987), Tandon and Urich (1987), Arora and Cerisola (2001, Durham (2001), 
Ehrmann and Fratzscher (2002), Andersen et al (2003, 2005), Miniane and Rogers (2004) and Robitaille and Roush 
(2004). 
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announcements could be detrimental to the Hong Kong economy. Specifically, they blame the 
fixed exchange rate of Hong Kong and point to the interest rates as the transmission mechanism.  
 Here, I look at a foreign equity market (Indice de Precios y Cotizaciones, or IPC) of a 
country (Mexico) that does not have a fixed exchange rate. I examine the response of the IPC to 
unexpected changes in federal funds target rate. Additionally, I examine whether the state of the 
Mexican economy is important for the IPC reaction to U.S. monetary policy. Wongswan (2005) 
and Hausman and Wongswan (2006) find that a surprise increase in the federal funds target rate 
of 100 basis points would provoke a decline in the Mexican equity market of approximately six 
percent. However, neither study considers the effects that the U.S. equity market might have that 
are independent of U.S. monetary shocks. The authors argue that since Mexico is in the same 
time zone as the U.S., these effects are negligible. However, Ehrmann and Fratzscher (2006) 
hold that even though Mexico is in the same hemisphere as the U.S., U.S. equity markets must be 
controlled for when looking at the Mexican equity market's reaction to FOMC announcements. 
They find that the reaction of the Mexican equity market to surprise changes in the federal funds 
target rate is statistically insignificant. They do find, however, that the future direction of U.S. 
monetary policy is statistically significant. 
 Controlling for the U.S. stock market, I find that the IPC drops by 6.66 percent when the 
federal funds target rate is increased unexpectedly by 100 basis points and vice versa. This result 
supports that found by Wongswan (2005) and Hausman and Wongswan (2006). I also find that 
the state of the Mexican economy matters. Furthermore, during periods where Mexico has 
witnessed at least two consecutive quarters of negative growth in real GDP, the IPC reacts by 
over 60 percent to an unexpected 100 basis-point change in the federal funds target rate. When 
this is not the case, the IPC reaction is significantly weaker. When using industrial production 
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instead, the magnitude is smaller, but it is still much more significant both economically and 
statistically than when Mexican industrial production is not declining for two consecutive 
quarters. This result is important in that it suggests that the exongenous event of a U.S. monetary 
surprise can cause significant damage to the Mexican stock exchange, especially if the Mexican 
economy is experiencing negative real growth.  
 Furthermore, these results suggest that the credit channel theory can be applied across the 
border. The Mexican equity market, like the U.S. equity market, suffers more during cyclical 
downturns when faced with U.S. monetary surprises. These results add to the literature in that 
previous work has ignored this aspect when looking at the surprise component of the FOMC 
announcements and their effect on foreign equity markets. 
 Additionally, these results make an empirical case for international monetary policy 
coordination, at least from Mexico's point of view. Theoretical models are mixed on whether 
international monetary policy coordination can bring gains. In their model, Obstfeld and Rogoff 
(2002) find that welfare gains from international monetary policy coordination are small and that 
un-coordinating policymakers can actually maximize global welfare if they are acting in an 
optimizing fashion individually. Canzoneri et al (2005) incorporate optimizing households, 
monopolistic competition and price stickiness into a similar theoretical framework as given by 
Obstfeld and Rogoff (2002) and find that coordination may matter. Here, my results suggest that 
from Mexico's point of view, monetary policy coordination with the US would be in their 
interests.  
 The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The next section offers an explanation of 
why the Mexican equity markets might react to surprises in U.S. monetary policy and then 
outlines the specific hypotheses I wish to test. Section 4.3 describes the estimation approach I 
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use and the data. In Section 4.4 the results are discussed. In section 4.5 different specifications 
are made to see how sensitive these results are. Finally, Section 4.6 gives a summary of the 
findings and draws some conclusions. 
4.2 TRANSMISSION CHANNELS AND TESTABLE HYPOTHESES 
4.2.1 Monetary Policy and Equity Markets 
From the finance literature, the discounted cash flow reasoning can be used to calculate the price 
of a financial asset by using future cash flows of the asset and determining their present value. If 
there is a monetary surprise, this will raise the rate at which these assets are discounted and 
hence, lower their price. Empirical evidence overwhelmingly supports this assertion. Ehrmann 
and Fratzscher (2004), Rigobon and Sack (2004) and Bernanke and Kuttner (2005) all conclude 
that a 100 basis-point surprise in the federal funds target rate would provoke a change in the U.S. 
equity market in the range of approximately four to six percent; this correlation is negative. 
4.2.2 Transmission Channels to Foreign Equity Markets 
Just as U.S. equity markets react to U.S. monetary policy, foreign equity markets might as well. 
The link depends on whether the federal funds target rate affects foreign interest rates, too. If so, 
then, the same logic as given by the discounted cash flow reasoning would apply to foreign 
equity markets. A surprise tightening in the federal funds target rate would increase the foreign 
discount rate through its effect on the global interest rate and hence, foreign equity prices would 
fall. Monticini and Vaciago (2005) find that Euro bond rates do react to FOMC surprises, but 
British rates do not.
27
 
                                                 
27
 They conclude that the BoE's focus on longer term rates may have something to do this, in addition to the less 
convincing argument that the BoE is older and therefore better at controlling its domestic rates than the ECB is.  
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 However, stock market co-movements must also be considered. For example, in their 
study of the Japanese and U.S. equity markets, Lin, Engle and Ito (1994) find that there is 
significant co-movement between these two markets with the causality going in both directions.   
4.2.3 Credit Channel Theory 
Bernanke and Gertler (1989) show that the state of the economy can play an important role when 
investigating the effects of changes in monetary policy. Specifically, when an economy is in a 
recession, changes in credit conditions brought on by monetary surprises have a bigger impact 
than when the economy is experiencing positive real GDP growth. This happens through two 
channels. Borrowers that are dependent on external financing suffer when the supply of bank 
credit is reduced. Also, firms become less credit worthy due to deterioration in the quality of 
their balance sheets from the cyclical downturn in the economy. Both of these channels together 
have a multiplier-type effect on real output. Because of this, the economy becomes more 
sensitive to macroeconomic changes during economic downturns than during economic booms. 
 The link between the domestic economy and domestic equity markets is well-
documented for many different economies. Andritzkya et al (2007) show that the bond market in 
emerging economies reacts to U.S. macroeconomic news. For Mexico, Lustig (2001) highlights 
how the U.S. economy can affect Mexico.  
 Empirically, when investigating stock market reactions to monetary surprises, most work 
looks at domestic monetary changes and the domestic equity market reaction. Using newspaper 
announcements and daily stock returns in the U.S. during the early 1990s, Warner and Georges 
(2001) find little evidence that supports the credit channel theory. Basistha and Kurov (2008), 
however, find support for the credit channel theory. They look at a longer time period and use a 
more sophisticated method for measuring monetary surprises and they show that the U.S. stock 
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market responds approximately twofold more to unexpected changes in the federal funds target 
rate during tight credit conditions than when credit is easier. 
4.2.4 Hypotheses 
In this paper I set forth to test two hypotheses. The first is that U.S. monetary shocks cause 
reactions by the Mexican equity market. The second is that this effect on the Mexican equity 
market is asymmetric; the Mexican equity market responds more when the Mexican economy is 
experiencing negative real growth.  
 While foreign equity market response to U.S. monetary surprises has been examined in 
the literature, the importance of cyclical variations for this response has not. As cited earlier, 
previous studies that account for cyclical variations use the U.S. equity markets as their focus, 
not foreign equity markets. This paper contributes to the literature in that both of these points are 
examined. 
4.3 ESTIMATION FRAMEWORK 
4.3.1 Event-study Approach 
In this paper an event-study approach is used. The events of interest are the surprise components 
from FOMC announcements concerning changes to the federal funds target rate. These include 
decisions to change as well as decisions not to change the federal funds target rate. Given that 
these policy decisions are anticipated by the market, all or some of the effect should already be 
incorporated into the foreign equity prices in the IPC. The degree to which the market correctly 
anticipates these policy changes will determine the degree of the impact. Complete anticipation 
by markets would suggest that IPC prices completely adjusted before the FOMC announcement. 
However, if the markets were surprised, or rather did not anticipate the event with complete 
accuracy, some reaction in IPC prices would be expected. 
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 After each event, I look at the daily movement of IPC prices. These events can be 
considered exogenous since the event window is short and the Fed is unlikely to react to 
Mexican equity markets. I also control for U.S. equity prices since some of the change in IPC 
prices could be due to the reaction of U.S. equity prices to U.S. monetary policy announcements 
rather than the announcements themselves. Two FOMC announcements are excluded from the 
sample. One announcement on February 4, 1994 occurred the same day as an employment 
release. Given that there is a strong positive correlation between the unexpected components of 
employment releases and FOMC announcements, U.S. monetary policy could be reacting to 
employment news and therefore, the FOMC announcements would not be exogenous.
28
 The 
other announcement was the one from September 17, 2001 which was in response to the events 
that took place on September 11, 2001.
29
 All other FOMC announcements from November 1993 
through September 2008 are included.
30
 FOMC announcements after September 2008 are not 
included due to the fact that the federal funds target rate and the federal funds effective rate were 
not in line after this date.
31
 The entire sample includes 127 observations. 
4.3.2 Target Rate Surprises 
To identify the effect of the FOMC announcements, the unanticipated component of the change 
in the federal funds target rate is inferred from changes in the current-month fed funds futures 
rate for the day of the announcement.
32
 This technique due to Kuttner (2001) is quite popular in 
the literature. It is calculated by the following formula: 
    )(
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28
 See Basistha and Kurov (2008). 
29
 See Bernanke and Kuttner (2005) 
30
 The beginning date of the sample is determined by the earliest available data for the IPC stock exchange. 
31
 In Gurkaynak (2005), he points out that when the federal funds target rate is different from the federal funds 
effective rate, the general calculation as given by Kuttner (2001) for monetary surprises cannot be used.  
32
 I thank Alex Kurov for providing me with this data. 
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where ∆it
u
 is the surprise component of the target rate change; ft
0
 is the fed funds rate inferred 
from the settlement price of the current-month fed funds futures contract; d represents the day on 
which the current FOMC meeting takes place and D is the number of days in the month. The 
subscript t represents the FOMC announcement. Also, the term 
dD
D  is a scaling factor that 
corrects for the number of remaining days in the month in which the rate change occurs.
33
 The 
average fed funds rate during the contract's month is used to calculate the settlement price of the 
fed funds futures. 
4.3.3 Mexican and U.S. Equity Data 
For Mexican equity prices, I use the Indice de Precios y Cotizaciones (IPC). The IPC is a 
collection of 35 stocks that are traded on the Bolsa Mexicana de Valores (BMV). This data is 
available at Yahoo! Finance. Since the BMV is open at the same time as the U.S. equity markets 
are, the data is the daily close-to-close percentage return of the IPC index on days of FOMC 
announcements. 
 Despite the fact that both the U.S. equity and Mexican equity markets have similar 
trading hours, it is still possible that changes in the IPC are being caused by the U.S. equity 
market itself, rather than the surprise component of the FOMC announcement. For U.S. equity 
prices I use the daily close-to-close percentage return of the Standard & Poor's 500 Index (S&P). 
This data is available at Yahoo! Finance as well. To isolate the effect that the S&P has on the 
IPC that is not related to U.S. monetary policy, I follow Basistha and Kurov (2008) and estimate 
the following equation: 
    
US
t
u
t
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t iR      (2) 
                                                 
33
 See Kuttner (2001) for more details on the scaling factor as well as the calculations of this component. 
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Here, Rt
US is daily return of the S&P on the day of the FOMC announcement (t). Again, 
the surprise component (∆it
u) is as before. The residuals (εt
US) from this estimation are 
kept and later used to proxy for the portion of the daily return in the S&P on the day of an 
FOMC announcement that cannot be attributed to the unexpected component of this 
announcement. 
4.3.4 Business Cycle Data 
In order to test whether cyclical variation matters for IPC reactions to the surprise component of 
FOMC announcements, I need a proxy for Mexican business cycles. In the U.S. business cycles 
are determined by the National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER). A similar measure for 
Mexico does not exist. The NBER defines a recession as follows:  
A recession is a significant decline in economic activity spread 
across the economy, lasting more than a few months, normally 
visible in production, employment, real income, and other 
indicators. A recession begins when the economy reaches a peak of 
activity and ends when the economy reaches its trough. Between 
trough and peak, the economy is in an expansion.
34
 
 
With this in mind, I attempt to proxy for Mexican business cycles. Therefore, I look at real 
output data, employment data and credit conditions for Mexico. 
4.3.5 Production Data 
To proxy cyclical variation, I use the standard "newspaper" definition of at least two quarters of 
negative real Mexican GDP growth. One of the major criticisms of this method of measuring 
business cycles is that since the frequency of the GDP series is quarterly, it gives a very general, 
if not vague, notion of when a change in the business cycle actually occurred. Since my goal is 
not to determine exact dates for the Mexican business cycle, but rather to determine general 
                                                 
34
 Source: NBER announcement on December 1, 2008 <<http://www.nber.org/cycles/dec2008.html>>. 
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periods of cyclical variation, this measure should be marginally sufficient. Using this metric, for 
Mexico there is one recession that occurs for the first 3 quarters of 1995. 
 Moreover, I also look at the Mexican Industrial Production (IP) index series obtained 
from the International Financial Statistics (IFS) from the International Monetary Fund (IMF). 
Here, I use a minimum of 6 months of negative growth to indicate periods of economic downturn 
in the Mexican economy. This generates one recession from the third quarter of 1994 through the 
third quarter of 1995.  
 Additionally, I also use a minimum of 4 months of negative growth as well, since this 
would correspond to negative growth crossing over a two-quarter span. This method generates 
the same recession as with the previous measure and an additional one for the first 2 quarters of 
2008. 
 Finally, given that a recent report by the IMF suggests that the entire year of 2008 will be 
considered a recession for Mexico once the data revisions have been made, I have also generated 
a series for both real GDP and the Industrial Production index that reflexes this forecast.
35
 These 
add one recession for the entire year of 2008 to the real GDP measure and the 6-month IP 
measure. 
 All business cycle variables mentioned above are binary variables which take on a value 
of one if the period is marked by negative real growth and a value of zero otherwise. 
4.3.6 Unemployment Data 
Given that employment is also a possible indicator of cyclical variation, I also use 
unemployment numbers for Mexico from the IFS. As with the real GDP business cycle 
indicators, I use a binary variable coded in the same manner. One limitation of the employment 
                                                 
35
 Source: Haver analytics, cited in the March 20, 2009 Economic Health Check report by the IMF. 
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series is that for the unemployment times series the availability of the data is limited to the time 
period from the first quarter of 2000 until the present. Using this measure there are two 
recessions: one from the third quarter of 2001 through the first quarter of 2002 and a second one 
for the entire year of 2008. 
4.3.7 Credit Market Data 
Finally, I use private credit data for Mexico from the IFS to proxy for credit cycles. This series is 
also shortened due to data availability; it starts from quarter one of 1997. As with the other 
cyclical variables, it is coded as a binary variable if two or more consecutive quarters exhibit 
negative growth. This measure generates three recessions: 1) The third quarter of 1998 through 
the first quarter of 1999; 2) The fourth quarter of 2000 through the first quarter of 2001; 3) The 
second and third quarters of 2005. 
4.4 EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
4.4.1 Benchmark results 
For the benchmark result, cyclical variations in the Mexican economy are ignored. Equation 3 is 
estimated: 
   t
US
t
u
t
MEX
t iR 21     (3) 
Here, the only new term relative to Equation 2 is Rt
MEX
 which is the daily return of the IPC on the 
day of the FOMC announcement. I estimate this equation using OLS and to account for the 
effect of outliers, a robust regression is run as well. The estimation procedure that I use is the 
MM-estimation. It is a type of weighted least squares given by Yohai (1987) that allows for 
robustness when outliers are thought to be present. 
 In Table 4 - 1 the results from both estimations of Equation 3 are provided. For the OLS 
estimation, the β1 coefficient is approximately -6.66. This indicates that a 100 basis-point 
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surprise increase in the federal funds target rate will cause a drop of nearly seven percent in the 
IPC. This effect is apart from any IPC comovements associated with the S&P not related to the 
U.S. monetary surprise. In the second column the β1 coefficient decreases significantly in 
magnitude suggesting the presence of outliers. However, approaching minus three percent, the 
coefficient is both economically and statistically significant. The interpretation here is that a 
positive shock of a 100 basis points to the federal funds target rate would invoke a fall of 2.83 
percent in the IPC. Wongswan (2005) estimates this coefficient to be -6.13 and -2.82; the latter 
excludes non-scheduled FOMC meetings. In his paper, however, U.S. equity returns are assumed 
not to affect the Mexican equity market because both operate during the same time zone. 
Hausman and Wongswan (2006) include the overall U.S. equity returns and find no statistically 
significant effect of FOMC announcements on the Mexican stock market. In this same paper, 
when they exclude the U.S. equity returns, the coefficient estimate then becomes approximately 
negative seven percent. In this last estimation, they control for the future expected direction of 
monetary policy, often referred to as the "path" surprise. Ehrmann et al (2005) control for sector 
and country fixed effects and find that the surprise component of the FOMC announcement is 
insignificant statistically concerning movements in the Mexican stock exchange. The non-US 
monetary effect from the S&P on the IPC in my regression is statistically significant with a 
magnitude of around 0.90. This is slightly greater than the estimate from Ehrmann et al (2005). 
4.4.2 Business Cycle indicator using real GDP 
Next, I allow for business cycles as measured by real Mexican GDP. I estimate Equation 4 
below: 
  t
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The new term relative to Equation 3 is the cyclical variation variable (Ct
MEX
); it interacts with the 
U.S. monetary surprise variable and takes on a value of one when the Mexican economy is in an 
economic downturn and zero, otherwise. From Table 4 - 2, in both the OLS estimation and the 
MM estimation, U.S. monetary shocks have a statistically significant and economic effect on the 
IPC. However, the magnitude of this effect is much greater when the Mexican economy is 
experiencing a contraction. Conducting a Wald test (H0: β1 = β2) confirms that the reaction of the 
Mexican stock market to an FOMC surprise when Mexico is suffering a recession is statistically 
different from the same reaction when the Mexican economy is not in a recession. 
 In the previous regression, the year 2008 is treated as an expansionary period. This will 
probably not be the case once the final revised data is announced. Given that forecasts for the 
Mexican real GDP are expected to be negative for the entire year of 2008, I allow the year 2008 
to be treated as a recession; the results change in magnitude, but the asymmetry is still present. 
Table 4 - 3 gives the results of the estimation of Equation 4 when the time series for the variable 
Ct
MEX
 reflects a contraction in the Mexican economy for the year 2008. 
 Compared to a value of approximately -60.00 to -70.00, the magnitude of the coefficient 
β2 is much smaller. The coefficient β1 is as well, but more importantly it is statistically 
insignificant in both estimations. Again, the difference in coefficients β1 and β2 is statistically 
significant. Also, this indicates that the recession of 1995 was much more of a driving force for 
the Mexican economy than the recession 2008 appears to be. 
4.4.3 Business Cycle indicator using the Industrial Production index 
Here, I change the business cycle indicator so that it is determined by the Mexican Industrial 
Production index. Specifically, I code 6 or more periods of negative IP growth in the Mexican 
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economy as a recessionary period (i.e. Ct
MEX
 =1). All other periods are treated as expansionary 
(Ct
MEX
 = 0). I estimate Equation 4 again. Table 4 - 4 provides the results.  
 In the OLS estimation, the IPC appears to react equally to U.S. monetary shocks 
regardless of the state of the economy. The coefficients are not statistically different. Moreover, 
only the coefficient β1 is statistically significant. Controlling for outliers, however, yields a 
different result. Now, both coefficients are statistically significant and the magnitude of β2 at 
negative 13.88 appears to be greater than the negative 2.66 for β1. The null of these two 
coefficients being equal is not rejected at the 10% significance level. 
 Again, using revised data which reflects 2008 as being a contractionary period I estimate 
Equation 4 and get the following results as given in Table 4 - 5. 
 The coefficient β2 is statistically significant in both estimations, while the coefficient β1 is 
not. In magnitude β2 is statistically different from β1 in the OLS estimation, but in the MM 
estimation it cannot be said that they are not different from each. 
4.4.4 Employment 
Another common gauge of business activity is employment. Here, I use employment data as my 
cyclical variation variable. In Table 4 - 6, I use at least two consecutive quarters of positive 
growth in unemployment as a proxy of business downturns. 
 In the OLS estimation, the cyclical variation matters, but in the MM estimation it does 
not. None of the cyclical variable coefficients are significant, except for the business downturn 
coefficient in the OLS estimation.  
4.4.5 Credit Markets 
Finally, I look at cyclical variation in the private credit market. 
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 In the OLS estimation, tightening of private credit markets matters slightly, but it is when 
outliers are controlled for that it matters the most. When private credit is shrinking, a 100-basis 
point surprise in the federal funds target rate is greeted with a negative 15.61 percent change in 
the IPC. This is statistically different from the β1 coefficient.  
4.5 OTHER FACTORS 
4.5.1 Do U.S. business cycles matter? 
It might be that the IPC is reacting to U.S. business cycles and not cyclical variations in the 
Mexican economy. Using NBER recession dates, I estimate Equation 5 below:
36
 
  t
US
t
US
t
u
t
US
t
u
t
MEX
t CiCiR 321 )1(   (5) 
where the cyclical variable (Ct
US
) corresponds to U.S. business cycles and interacts with the U.S. 
monetary shock variable (i) and takes on a value of one when the U.S. economy is in an 
economic downturn and zero, otherwise.. The other variables are the same as in Equation 4. 
 From Table 4 - 8, in both the OLS estimation and the MM estimation, the U.S. business 
cycle monetary shocks have a statistically significant and economic effect on the IPC. However, 
in neither estimation is β1 - β2 statistically different from zero. The IPC clearly does not react 
differently to the FOMC announcements when the U.S. economy is in an NBER recession. 
4.5.2 US returns as Independent Variable 
In Hausman and Wongswan (2006), they estimate Equation 6 and Equation 7: 
   t
US
t
u
t
MEX
t RiR 21     (6) 
where Rt
US
 represents the return of the U.S. equity market on the day of FOMC 
announcements.
37
  
                                                 
36
 See http://www.nber.org/cycles.html for NBER US business cycle dates. 
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   t
US
t
u
t
MEX
t RiR 21     (7) 
Here, λ represents the degree of comovement between the IPC and the S&P. It is obtained from 
the following time series regression: 
    t
US
t
MEX
t RR 10      (8) 
in which the daily returns from the IPC are regressed on the daily returns from the S&P over the 
entire time period of this study (November 1993 through September 2008). Here, the value of λ 
is approximately 0.79. 
 I estimate variations of Equation 6 and Equation 7, incorporating the cyclical variables 
for the Mexican economy. 
  t
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t RCiCiR 321 )1(  (10) 
In both the OLS and MM estimation, the IPC responds in a statistically significant manner when 
the Mexican economy is in a downturn. At approximately -16.00, this response is economically 
significant. Furthermore, the coefficient β1 is small and statistically insignificant in both 
estimations. Additionally, β1 minus β2 is statistically different from zero at the one percent 
significance level. 
4.6 CONCLUDING REMARKS 
Here I document the reaction of the IPC to U.S. monetary shocks. I control for the comovement 
of the IPC with the S&P. I find that the IPC is responsive to U.S. monetary shocks. I also 
examine whether the IPC's response depends on cyclical variations in the Mexican economy. 
Given that there are no official business cycle dates, I use several proxies. I find that for the 
                                                                                                                                                             
37
 If it is believed that there is comovement between the BMV and the S&P, it can be shown that the value of the 
coefficient for the US monetary shock is understated. 
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popular recession measure of two or more consecutive contractions in real GDP the IPC reaction 
is asymmetric. That is, when the Mexican economy is experiencing negative real GDP growth, 
the Mexican equity market reaction to surprises in the FOMC announcements is greater than 
when the Mexican economy is not contracting. 
 This finding is robust to using other techniques for measuring U.S. monetary shock 
spillover effects to foreign equity markets, but it is not robust to every measure of Mexican 
cyclical variations. Specifically, it does not do well with the unemployment proxy.  
 These findings contribute to the literature in two ways. One, they support the idea that the 
credit channel applies across international borders and is certainly present in the case of the 
Mexican-U.S. border. Credit constrained firms in Mexico suffer the effects of U.S. monetary 
surprises when the Mexican economy is in a recession more than when the Mexican economy is 
growing. The state of the Mexican economy is important. Secondly, these results support the 
need for international monetary policy coordination, at least from Mexico's point of view.  
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4.7 APPENDIX  
Table 4 - 1 
OLS Robust
-6.66*** -2.83**
(1.44) (1.34)
0.83*** 0.92***
(0.10) (0.09)
Intercept 0.39*** 0.35***
(0.12) (0.11)
Number of observations 127 126
Mexico Stock Return
Monetary Surprise
Residuals from US Stock Return on US 
Monetary Surprise
 
In this table the coefficients for the regression [Rt
MEX = α + β1∆it
u + β2εt
US +μt] 
are given. The dependent variable is the close-to-close daily return of the BMV 
on the day of an FOMC announcement. The term ∆it
u is the unexpected 
component from the FOMC announcement and εt
US are the residuals from a 
regression of the close-to-close daily return of the S&P on the day of an FOMC 
announcement on the same ∆it
u mentioned above. The first column gives the 
OLS estimation and the second column gives the MM estimation. The standard 
errors are in parenthesis and statistically significant coefficients are in bold 
(***,**,* represent one, five and ten percent levels of statistical significance). 
 
 
Table 4 - 2 
OLS Robust
-6.29*** -2.45*
(1.39) (1.30)
-68.99*** -63.01***
(20.24) (17.13)
0.82*** 0.92***
(0.09) (0.08)
Intercept 0.43*** 0.38***
(0.12) (0.10)
β1 - β2 0.003 0.001
Number of observations 127 126
Mexico Stock Return
Monetary Surprise during Mexican 
Boom (real GDP)
Monetary Surprise during Mexican 
Recession (real GDP)
Residuals from US Stock Return on US 
Monetary Surprise
 
In Table 4 - 2 the coefficients for the regression [Rt
MEX = α + β1∆it
u(1-Ct
MEX) + 
β2∆it
uCt
MEX + β3εt
US +μt] are given. The dependent variable is the close-to-close 
daily return of the BMV on the day of an FOMC announcement. The term ∆it
u 
is the unexpected component from the FOMC announcement and εt
US are the 
residuals from a regression of the close-to-close daily return of the S&P on the 
day of an FOMC announcement on the same ∆it
u mentioned above. The 
interaction term Ct
MEX is a binary variable that proxies cyclical variations in the 
Mexican economy; here, this term is based on real Mexican GDP. It takes on a 
value of 1 if FOMC announcement occurs during a contraction in the Mexican 
economy and 0, otherwise. As before, the first column gives the OLS 
estimation and the second column gives the MM estimation. The standard 
errors are in parenthesis and statistically significant coefficients are in bold 
(***,**,* represent one, five and ten percent levels of statistical significance). 
The fifth row gives the p-value that the null hypothesis of β1 - β2 = 0 is rejected.  
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Table 4 - 3 
OLS Robust
-2.16 -1.87
(1.54) (1.45)
-19.47*** -19.42***
(2.69) (2.54)
1.03*** 0.98***
(0.10) (0.09)
Intercept 0.42*** 0.37***
(0.11) (0.11)
β1 - β2 0.000 0.000
Number of observations 127 127
Mexico Stock Return
Monetary Surprise during Mexican 
Boom (real GDP - 2008 recession)
Monetary Surprise during Mexican 
Recession (real GDP - 2008 recession)
Residuals from US Stock Return on US 
Monetary Surprise
 
In Table 4 - 3 the coefficients for the regression [Rt
MEX = α + β1∆it
u(1-Ct
MEX) + 
β2∆it
uCt
MEX + β3εt
US +μt] are given. The dependent variable is the close-to-close 
daily return of the BMV on the day of an FOMC announcement. The term ∆it
u 
is the unexpected component from the FOMC announcement and εt
US are the 
residuals from a regression of the close-to-close daily return of the S&P on the 
day of an FOMC announcement on the same ∆it
u mentioned above. The 
interaction term Ct
MEX is a binary variable that proxies cyclical variations in the 
Mexican economy; here, this term is based on real Mexican GDP. It takes on a 
value of 1 if FOMC announcement occurs during a contraction in the Mexican 
economy and 0, otherwise. As before, the first column gives the OLS 
estimation and the second column gives the MM estimation. The standard 
errors are in parenthesis and statistically significant coefficients are in bold 
(***,**,* represent one, five and ten percent levels of statistical significance). 
The fifth row gives the p-value that the null hypothesis of β1 - β2 = 0 is rejected.  
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Table 4 - 4 
OLS Robust
-6.66*** -2.66*
(1.48) (1.40)
-6.53 -13.88*
(6.17) (7.91)
0.83*** 0.91***
(0.10) (0.09)
Intercept 0.39*** 0.37***
(0.12) (0.11)
β1 - β2 0.983 0.166
Number of observations 127 125
Monetary Surprise during Mexican 
Recession (IP index - 6 months)
Mexico Stock Return
Residuals from US Stock Return on US 
Monetary Surprise
Monetary Surprise during Mexican 
Boom (IP index - 6 months)
 
In Table 4 - 4 the coefficients for the regression [Rt
MEX = α + β1∆it
u(1-Ct
MEX) + 
β2∆it
uCt
MEX + β3εt
US +μt] are given. The dependent variable is the close-to-close 
daily return of the BMV on the day of an FOMC announcement. The term ∆it
u 
is the unexpected component from the FOMC announcement and εt
US are the 
residuals from a regression of the close-to-close daily return of the S&P on the 
day of an FOMC announcement on the same ∆it
u mentioned above. The 
interaction term Ct
MEX is a binary variable that proxies cyclical variations in the 
Mexican economy; here, this term is based on 6 or more consecutive months of 
negative growth in the Mexican IP index. It takes on a value of 1 if FOMC 
announcement occurs during a contraction in the Mexican economy and 0, 
otherwise. As before, the first column gives the OLS estimation and the second 
column gives the MM estimation. The standard errors are in parenthesis and 
statistically significant coefficients are in bold (***,**,* represent one, five and 
ten percent levels of statistical significance). The fifth row gives the p-value 
that the null hypothesis of β1 - β2 = 0 is rejected.  
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Table 4 - 5 
OLS Robust
-2.33 -1.95
(1.65) (1.51)
-16.36*** -7.64**
(2.55) (3.57)
1.00*** 0.94***
(0.10) (0.09)
Intercept 0.42*** 0.35***
(0.12) (0.11)
β1 - β2 0.000 0.155
Number of observations 127 126
Monetary Surprise during Mexican 
Boom (IP index - 2008 recession)
Monetary Surprise during Mexican 
Recession (IP index - 2008 recession)
Residuals from US Stock Return on US 
Monetary Surprise
Mexico Stock Return
 
In Table 45 the coefficients for the regression [Rt
MEX = α + β1∆it
u(1-Ct
MEX) + 
β2∆it
uCt
MEX + β3εt
US +μt] are given. The dependent variable is the close-to-close 
daily return of the BMV on the day of an FOMC announcement. The term ∆it
u 
is the unexpected component from the FOMC announcement and εt
US are the 
residuals from a regression of the close-to-close daily return of the S&P on the 
day of an FOMC announcement on the same ∆it
u mentioned above. The 
interaction term Ct
MEX is a binary variable that proxies cyclical variations in the 
Mexican economy; here, this term is based on 6 or more consecutive months of 
negative growth in the Mexican IP index. It takes on a value of 1 if FOMC 
announcement occurs during a contraction in the Mexican economy and 0, 
otherwise. As before, the first column gives the OLS estimation and the second 
column gives the MM estimation. The standard errors are in parenthesis and 
statistically significant coefficients are in bold (***,**,* represent one, five and 
ten percent levels of statistical significance). The fifth row gives the p-value 
that the null hypothesis of β1 - β2 = 0 is rejected.  
 
 
 84 
  
Table 4 - 6 
OLS Robust
-1.15 -1.19
(1.69) (1.61)
-15.93*** -4.49
(2.35) (3.77)
0.90*** 0.84***
(0.10) (0.09)
Intercept 0.25** 0.25**
(0.13) (0.12)
β1 - β2 0.000 0.437
Number of observations 76 75
Monetary Surprise during Mexican 
Boom (Unemployment)
Monetary Surprise during Mexican 
Recession (Unemployment)
Residuals from US Stock Return on US 
Monetary Surprise
Mexico Stock Return
 
In Table 4 - 6 the coefficients for the regression [Rt
MEX = α + β1∆it
u(1-Ct
MEX) + 
β2∆it
uCt
MEX + β3εt
US +μt] are given. The dependent variable is the close-to-close 
daily return of the BMV on the day of an FOMC announcement. The term ∆it
u 
is the unexpected component from the FOMC announcement and εt
US are the 
residuals from a regression of the close-to-close daily return of the S&P on the 
day of an FOMC announcement on the same ∆it
u mentioned above. The 
interaction term Ct
MEX is a binary variable that proxies cyclical variations in the 
Mexican economy; here, this term is based on 2 or more consecutive quarters 
of positive growth in the Mexican unemployed. It takes on a value of 1 if 
FOMC announcement occurs during a contraction in the Mexican economy and 
0, otherwise. As before, the first column gives the OLS estimation and the 
second column gives the MM estimation. The standard errors are in parenthesis 
and statistically significant coefficients are in bold (***,**,* represent one, five 
and ten percent levels of statistical significance). The fifth row gives the p-
value that the null hypothesis of β1 - β2 = 0 is rejected.  
 85 
  
Table 4 - 7 
OLS Robust
-6.36*** -2.06
(1.68) (2.20)
-9.71*** -15.61***
(3.01) (4.73)
0.76*** 0.84***
(0.10) (0.09)
Intercept 0.33** 0.36***
(0.13) (0.11)
β1 - β2 0.344 0.013
Number of observations 101 98
Mexico Stock Return
Monetary Surprise during Mexican 
Boom (Private Credit)
Monetary Surprise during Mexican 
Recession (Private Credit)
Residuals from US Stock Return on US 
Monetary Surprise
 
In Table 4 - 7 the coefficients for the regression [Rt
MEX = α + β1∆it
u(1-Ct
MEX) + 
β2∆it
uCt
MEX + β3εt
US +μt] are given. The dependent variable is the close-to-close 
daily return of the BMV on the day of an FOMC announcement. The term ∆it
u 
is the unexpected component from the FOMC announcement and εt
US are the 
residuals from a regression of the close-to-close daily return of the S&P on the 
day of an FOMC announcement on the same ∆it
u mentioned above. The 
interaction term Ct
MEX is a binary variable that proxies cyclical variations in the 
Mexican economy; here, this term is based on 2 or more consecutive quarters 
of negative growth in Mexican private credit. It takes on a value of 1 if FOMC 
announcement occurs during a contraction in the Mexican economy and 0, 
otherwise. As before, the first column gives the OLS estimation and the second 
column gives the MM estimation. The standard errors are in parenthesis and 
statistically significant coefficients are in bold (***,**,* represent one, five and 
ten percent levels of statistical significance). The fifth row gives the p-value 
that the null hypothesis of β1 - β2 = 0 is rejected.  
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Table 4 - 8 
OLS Robust
-6.10*** -4.24**
(2.35) (1.98)
-6.99*** -3.94*
(1.81) (2.38)
0.83*** 0.94***
(0.10) (0.09)
Intercept 0.39*** 0.36***
(0.12) (0.11)
β1 - β2 0.766 0.922
Number of observations 127 125
Mexico Stock Return
Monetary Surprise during US Boom 
(NBER)
Monetary Surprise during US Recession 
(NBER)
Residuals from US Stock Return on US 
Monetary Surprise
 
In Table 4 - 8 the coefficients for the regression [Rt
MEX = α + β1∆it
u(1-Ct
US) + 
β2∆it
uCt
US + β3εt
US +μt] are given. The dependent variable is the close-to-close 
daily return of the BMV on the day of an FOMC announcement. The term ∆it
u 
is the unexpected component from the FOMC announcement and εt
US are the 
residuals from a regression of the close-to-close daily return of the S&P on the 
day of an FOMC announcement on the same ∆it
u mentioned above. The 
interaction term Ct
US is a binary variable that proxies cyclical variations in the 
U.S. economy; here, this term is based on the NBER dating of recessions. It 
takes on a value of 1 if FOMC announcement occurs during a contraction in the 
U.S. economy and 0, otherwise. As before, the first column gives the OLS 
estimation and the second column gives the MM estimation. The standard 
errors are in parenthesis and statistically significant coefficients are in bold 
(***,**,* represent one, five and ten percent levels of statistical significance). 
The fifth row gives the p-value that the null hypothesis of β1 - β2 = 0 is rejected.  
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Table 4 - 9 
OLS Robust
1.42 1.55
(1.64) (1.54)
-15.89*** -16.00***
(2.60) (2.45)
1.03*** 0.98***
(0.10) (0.09)
Intercept 0.12 0.08
(0.12) (0.11)
β1 - β2 0.000 0.000
Number of observations 127 127
Mexico Stock Return
Monetary Surprise during Mexican 
Boom (real GDP - 2008 recession)
Monetary Surprise during Mexican 
Recession (real GDP - 2008 recession)
US Stock Return
 
In Table 4 - 9 the coefficients for the regression [Rt
MEX = α + β1∆it
u(1-Ct
MEX) + 
β2∆it
uCt
MEX + β3Rt
US +μt] are given. The dependent variable is the close-to-close 
daily return of the BMV on the day of an FOMC announcement. The term ∆it
u 
is the unexpected component from the FOMC announcement and εt
US are the 
residuals from a regression of the close-to-close daily return of the S&P on the 
day of an FOMC announcement on the same ∆it
u mentioned above. The 
interaction term Ct
MEX is a binary variable that proxies cyclical variations in the 
Mexican economy; here, this term is based on real Mexican GDP. It takes on a 
value of 1 if FOMC announcement occurs during a contraction in the Mexican 
economy and 0, otherwise. As before, the first column gives the OLS 
estimation and the second column gives the MM estimation. The standard 
errors are in parenthesis and statistically significant coefficients are in bold 
(***,**,* represent one, five and ten percent levels of statistical significance). 
The fifth row gives the p-value that the null hypothesis of β1 - β2 = 0 is rejected.  
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Table 4 - 10 
OLS Robust
1.42 1.55
(1.64) (1.54)
-15.89*** -16.00***
(2.60) (2.45)
1.30*** 1.24***
(0.12) (0.11)
Intercept 0.12 0.08
(0.12) (0.11)
β1 - β2 0.000 0.000
Number of observations 127 127
Monetary Surprise during Mexican 
Boom (real GDP - 2008 recession)
Monetary Surprise during Mexican 
Recession (real GDP - 2008 recession)
US Stock Return times Comovement 
factor
Mexico Stock Return
 
In Table 4 - 10 the coefficients for the regression [Rt
MEX = α + β1∆it
u(1-Ct
MEX) + 
β2∆it
uCt
MEX + β3λRt
US +μt] are given. The dependent variable is the close-to-
close daily return of the BMV on the day of an FOMC announcement. The 
term ∆it
u is the unexpected component from the FOMC announcement and εt
US 
are the residuals from a regression of the close-to-close daily return of the S&P 
on the day of an FOMC announcement on the same ∆it
u mentioned above. The 
interaction term Ct
MEX is a binary variable that proxies cyclical variations in the 
Mexican economy; here, this term is based on real Mexican GDP. It takes on a 
value of 1 if FOMC announcement occurs during a contraction in the Mexican 
economy and 0, otherwise. As before, the first column gives the OLS 
estimation and the second column gives the MM estimation. The standard 
errors are in parenthesis and statistically significant coefficients are in bold 
(***,**,* represent one, five and ten percent levels of statistical significance). 
The fifth row gives the p-value that the null hypothesis of β1 - β2 = 0 is rejected.  
 
 
 
Table 4 - 11 
Mean Median Maximum Minimum
Standard 
Deviation
U.S. Monetary 
Surprises -1.1804 0.0000 19.0800 -42.5000 8.6090
S&P Returns 0.3403 0.2526 5.0099 -4.7141 1.2969
IPC Returns 0.4660 0.3689 6.5528 -4.7173 1.8210  
In Table 4 - 11 U.S. Monetary Surprises are given in basis points. The equity 
returns are given in percentage returns.  
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CHAPTER 5. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
This dissertation attempts to answer several question concerning financial market linkages to 
the macro economy. Chapter 2 asks whether credit matters for real U.S. GDP, whether credit 
matters for inflation in the U.S. and whether different measures of credit give different 
results. I find that credit surprises can impact real GDP. Their impact on inflation, however, 
is less. Also, the choice of credit variable matters for both. Real GDP is affected by changes 
in credit-to-income ratios and certain interest rate spreads. Spreads that measure the highest 
risk rates against the lowest risk rates tend to be the most important ones. Credit-to-income 
ratios also are important for innovations to real GDP. Inflation is not as responsive to credit 
shocks. Only a few credit aggregates and interest rate spreads appear to be influential for 
innovations in inflation. Inflation does not seem to respond to shocks to credit-to-income 
ratios.  
In Chapter 3, I test two hypotheses:  1) Fiscal policy matters for real interest rates; and 2) 
Financial openness affects the impact of fiscal policy on real interest rates. I find evidence that 
supports the first hypothesis, but not the second one. The first result supports the Keynesian IS-
LM view. The second result appears to be surprising, but it echoes the results found in the 
economic growth literature which show that financial openness is very difficult to capture. 
Furthermore, while I accept the first hypothesis, the results do not find this channel to be lasting 
or pronounced. Fiscal policy seems to matter for real interest rates, but this effect is small and 
temporary. 
 Chapter 4 explores two hypotheses. First, the Mexican equity market reacts to U.S. 
monetary shocks. Second, this effect is asymmetric and the Mexican equity market's response is 
greater when the Mexican economy is experiencing a recession. I find evidence to support both 
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hypotheses. I find that the Mexican equity market reacts to surprises in the FOMC 
announcements. Additionally, using several proxies for Mexican recessions, I find that when the 
Mexican economy is in a recession, the Mexican equity market reaction is greater than when the 
Mexican economy is not contracting. These findings support the notion that the credit channel 
applies across international borders, at least for the case of the Mexican-U.S. border. Credit 
constrained firms in Mexico suffer the effects of U.S. monetary surprises when the Mexican 
economy is in a recession more than when the Mexican economy is growing. The state of the 
Mexican economy is important.  
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